Indian courts, clearly reported
Download today’s paperArchives

Saved newspaper

6 Oct 2026 — The Lawyers' Post — Daily Edition

Saved newspaper edition with 15 court reports.

Download newspaper edition · Paper archive

  1. Civil Payment Dispute Cannot Become Cheating Prosecution
  2. Unproven Bribe Demand Cannot Sustain Corruption Conviction
  3. Tax Classification Depends on Goods at Time of Sale
  4. Academic Sympathy Cannot Override IIT Eligibility Rules
  5. Marriage Cannot Erase Alleged POCSO Offences
  6. Advocates Are Not Guarantors for Missing Litigants
  7. Delhi Riots Petitions Fail to Secure Fresh Investigation
  8. Bar Council Cannot Suspend Advocates Pending Inquiry
  9. Long-Serving Teacher Wins Gratuity With Interest
  10. Spa Customers Face Trafficking Charges Despite Victims’ Retraction
  11. Juvenility Claim Quashes Life Sentence but Preserves Conviction
  12. Kerala High Court: Intellectual disability alone cannot disqualify accused from facing trial
  13. 5-Day Deadline for DRT Written Statements Sparks High Court Divide
  14. Justice PS Koshy to take charge as Acting Chief Justice of Telangana High Court
  15. Court-Ordered Fixed Deposits Cannot Face Arbitrary Interest Cuts, Delhi High Court Rules

Civil Payment Dispute Cannot Become Cheating Prosecution

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court has quashed a cheating prosecution arising from an unpaid steel transaction, holding that criminal law cannot be used as a substitute for recovering disputed contractual debts.

In Yogesh Premjibhai Suvariya v State of Gujarat, the directors of a steel-trading company faced proceedings over ₹1.19 crore in supplies and dishonoured post-dated cheques. The Gujarat High Court had discharged them from criminal breach of trust but retained the cheating charge.

The Supreme Court said cheating requires dishonest intention and deception at the inception of the transaction. Neither the complaint nor the record showed a false representation or inducement when the purchase orders were placed. The parties had conducted business for years, and the grievance concerned non-payment.

The bench said police cannot function as a civil recovery forum. Continuing the prosecution would therefore abuse the judicial process. It set aside the High Court and magistrate orders and quashed the criminal case, leaving the complainant free to pursue civil remedies.

Read current report and source

Unproven Bribe Demand Cannot Sustain Corruption Conviction

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court has acquitted a former Jharkhand education official of corruption charges, ruling that recovery of marked currency cannot replace proof that a bribe was demanded and knowingly accepted.

In Ajit Kumar v State of Jharkhand, decided on 5 October 2026, the appellant challenged convictions under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He had already completed the four-year sentence and paid the fine but pursued the appeal to clear his name.

The prosecution alleged that the official sought ₹5,000 to release an orderly’s salary. The Court found material contradictions surrounding the alleged demand, trap and recovery. It reiterated that demand and voluntary acceptance are indispensable facts; possession of tainted notes alone is insufficient.

Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S Chandurkar held that the prosecution had failed to establish either element beyond reasonable doubt. They set aside the trial court and Jharkhand High Court judgments and declared the appellant cleared of the charges.

Read current report and source

Tax Classification Depends on Goods at Time of Sale

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court has held that tax classification must be determined by the form in which goods exist when sold, not by how a buyer may later use them.

In Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax v Cadila Health Care Ltd, decided on 5 October 2026, the Court examined GRD Powder and GRD Mix under Madhya Pradesh’s commercial-tax regime. The revenue argued that consumers dilute the products with milk or water, bringing them within the entry for non-alcoholic drinks and beverages.

Justices Manmohan and Arun Palli rejected that approach. The products were sold as powder and biscuit, while the statutory entry referred to drinks and beverages in liquid form. Consumer preparation after sale could not import an end-use test into an otherwise clear classification provision.

The Court said goods that do not answer a specific entry must fall within the residuary category and cannot be forced into a higher-tax entry. It dismissed the revenue’s appeals, preserving the eight per cent classification applied by the High Court.

Read current report and source

Academic Sympathy Cannot Override IIT Eligibility Rules

Delhi High Court · Editorial Team

The Delhi High Court has rejected a student’s request for a supernumerary IIT seat, holding that sympathy and possible academic loss cannot replace prescribed admission eligibility.

In Ashi Agarwal v Union of India, decided on 1 October 2026, the petitioner alleged evaluation errors in JEE Main 2025 and said illness prevented her effective participation in a later session. She sought admission in 2026 while preserving the academic opportunity she said had been lost.

Justice Jasmeet Singh held that the governing 2026 information brochure applied when her representation was considered. The petitioner did not satisfy its eligibility criterion, and the scheme contained no power to relax that mandatory condition merely because she had qualified to attempt an earlier examination.

The Court said a supernumerary seat is not an ordinary consequential remedy in a competitive, merit-based system. Without proof that official illegality caused the lost opportunity, judicial discretion could not create an admission route outside the rules or reopen a completed examination cycle.

The petition and consequential applications were dismissed.

Read current report and source

Marriage Cannot Erase Alleged POCSO Offences

Delhi High Court · Editorial Team

The Delhi High Court has refused to quash a child-sexual-offence prosecution solely because the complainant later married the accused and wished to preserve their family.

In X v State, decided on 1 October 2026, the case began when the girl, then under 17, disappeared from home. She was later found pregnant and said she had left voluntarily with the petitioner. After attaining majority, she married him; they now have a child and both she and her mother supported ending the case.

Justice Sanjeev Narula held that consent or later family acceptance could not erase the legal consequences of alleged sexual acts during childhood. The investigation was not shown to be malicious, manifestly false or an abuse of process. A subsequent marriage and compromise therefore did not justify terminating an otherwise sustainable prosecution.

The Court dismissed the quashing petition but preserved the petitioner’s bail. It directed the special court to decide charges and evidence independently, without treating the High Court’s threshold findings as conclusions on guilt.

Read current report and source

Advocates Are Not Guarantors for Missing Litigants

Gauhati High Court · Editorial Team

The Gauhati High Court has set aside costs and a professional-misconduct referral imposed on two advocates after the petitioner in their case could no longer be located.

In Harbinder Singh Kalsi v State of Assam, the advocates had filed a writ petition seeking a court-monitored investigation into a former police officer’s death. A single judge dismissed the petition after the named petitioner could not be traced, imposed ₹50,000 costs on each lawyer and referred them to the Bar Council.

The appellate bench upheld dismissal of the underlying petition but said advocates cannot be made guarantors for a client’s physical whereabouts after filing. The lawyers said the petitioner had appeared in the High Court campus, was identified through ordinary institutional channels and had previously been named in a property caveat.

Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury removed the costs and disciplinary referral. They nevertheless cautioned advocates to verify clients and pleadings carefully when accepting instructions through professional colleagues.

Read current report and source

Delhi Riots Petitions Fail to Secure Fresh Investigation

Delhi High Court · Editorial Team

The Delhi High Court has dismissed a group of petitions seeking broad judicial intervention in investigations, evidence preservation, compensation and rehabilitation arising from the 2020 north-east Delhi riots.

In Shaikh Mujtaba Farooq v Union of India and connected cases, decided on 5 October 2026, petitioners alleged police misconduct and sought fresh FIRs, an independent investigative mechanism and further inquiries.

Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Manoj Jain said misconduct allegations, without more, did not justify transferring investigations or ordering a wholesale reinvestigation. Individual complainants retained ordinary legal remedies, but the record did not establish exceptional circumstances requiring the High Court to replace existing investigative and statutory processes.

The Court also declined general compensation and rehabilitation directions. An established claims mechanism had processed numerous cases, and individual loss required fact-specific assessment. Six years after the violence, the petitioners had not demonstrated a systemic failure leaving an identifiable class without remedies.

The bench dismissed the petitions while preserving each affected person’s right to pursue remedies available in law.

Read current report and source

Bar Council Cannot Suspend Advocates Pending Inquiry

Allahabad High Court · Editorial Team

The Allahabad High Court has ruled that a State Bar Council cannot impose an interim suspension from legal practice while disciplinary proceedings remain pending.

In Akhilesh Jaiswal v Bar Council of India, decided on 1 October 2026, two office-bearers of a Lucknow bar association challenged an order suspending their enrolment indefinitely until further orders. The disciplinary committee had adjourned the matter while simultaneously preventing them from appearing in court.

A division bench said Section 35(3) of the Advocates Act treats suspension as a final disciplinary sanction following notice, charges, trial and hearing. The statute does not confer a separate power to suspend an advocate at the interim stage. An indefinite suspension was additionally inconsistent with the provision’s requirement that any suspension specify a period.

The Court quashed the order and directed the advocates to attend the next disciplinary hearing. It also required the Bar Council to supply outstanding documents upon a timely request, while cautioning the petitioners against unnecessary adjournments.

Read current report and source

Long-Serving Teacher Wins Gratuity With Interest

Allahabad High Court · Editorial Team

The Allahabad High Court has ordered payment of gratuity with interest to a madrasa teacher, rejecting the state’s reliance on her failure to choose retirement at 60.

In Raisa Khan v State of Uttar Pradesh, decided on 30 September 2026, the petitioner had served from August 1992 until retiring in March 2019 at 62. Authorities paid other benefits but denied gratuity because she had not exercised an option for the earlier retirement age.

Justice Irshad Ali held that gratuity is a distinct retirement benefit whose denial requires an independent legal foundation. The state had allowed and accepted the petitioner’s continued service, and could not use that same service period to defeat her claim. Payment of other dues did not answer the gratuity question.

The Court quashed the rejection order and directed calculation and payment within three months. It also awarded six per cent annual interest from 31 March 2019 until actual payment.

Read current report and source

Spa Customers Face Trafficking Charges Despite Victims’ Retraction

Kerala High Court · Editorial Team

The Kerala High Court has ruled that customers allegedly found at a brothel may face prosecution under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act even when alleged victims later retract their accusations.

In Praveen Sodharan v State of Kerala, decided on 23 September 2026, six accused sought to quash proceedings arising from a police search of a spa. Several women filed affidavits denying coercion or exploitation.

Justice Jobin Sebastian held that recantation alone could not extinguish a prosecution at the threshold where the investigation produced disputed factual material requiring trial. The Court found insufficient material to treat four alleged customers as managers, recruiters or harbourers, and quashed charges under Section 143 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Sections 4 and 6 of the trafficking law against them.

However, their alleged purchase of sexual services could support charges under Sections 5 and 7. The Court also allowed the alleged operators’ prosecution to continue, leaving trafficking and evidentiary questions to the trial court.

Read current report and source

Juvenility Claim Quashes Life Sentence but Preserves Conviction

Uttarakhand High Court · Editorial Team

The Uttarakhand High Court has preserved a murder conviction but erased the life sentence after determining that the appellant was 17 when the offence occurred.

In Rajiv Kashyap v State of Uttarakhand, the appellant challenged his 2019 conviction under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. During the appeal, he raised juvenility and said he lacked documentary proof of age.

A court-directed ossification test and an inquiry by the Registrar Judicial placed his age at 17 on 27 October 2013. The bench treated that inquiry as conclusive proof under juvenile-justice law, noting that a juvenility claim may be raised even after proceedings have advanced.

Following Supreme Court precedent, Justices Ravindra Maithani and Siddhartha Sah held that the common evidence supporting conviction did not require acquittal. However, the punishments imposed on an adult basis could not stand against a juvenile. The Court quashed the sentences, cancelled the appellant’s bail bonds and said he need not surrender.

Read current report and source

Kerala High Court: Intellectual disability alone cannot disqualify accused from facing trial

Kerala High Court · Sheikh Rayees

A low IQ or an intellectual disability, by itself, cannot be treated as proof that an accused is incapable of standing trial, the Kerala High Court has ruled.

Justice Jobin Sebastian held that the test under Section 368 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is not simply whether an accused has an intellectual disability. The court must instead determine whether the person's mental condition actually prevents them from understanding the proceedings and participating in their defence.

The ruling came in a revision petition filed by a 20-year-old accused, referred to as Raj, who is facing proceedings before a special court in Punalur under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act.

Raj had sought postponement of the trial, claiming that his intellectual disability left him unable to defend himself. A trial court conducted an inquiry and concluded that he was competent to face the proceedings.

Challenging that decision before the High Court, Raj relied on medical records showing an IQ score of 35 and an assessment placing his social age at around 10 years. His side also highlighted developmental difficulties dating back to childhood and the assistance he had required during his education, including the use of a scribe in examinations.

The High Court, however, noted that the medical board which examined Raj had reached a different conclusion on his ability to participate in the case.

According to the medical assessment, Raj was able to understand the allegations against him, grasp the nature of the court proceedings and respond to questions put to him.

The Court therefore found no reason to interfere with the trial court's conclusion that he was fit to stand trial.

Justice Sebastian stressed that Section 368 requires an assessment of the accused's actual functional ability. The relevant questions include whether the person understands what the proceedings are about, can comprehend questions put to them and is capable of communicating relevant information and instructions to their lawyer.

The Court cautioned against treating an intellectual disability diagnosis or a low IQ score as an automatic bar to criminal proceedings.

The focus, it said, must remain on how the condition affects the accused's ability to understand and participate in the case.

Holding that Raj was capable of taking part in the proceedings, the High Court dismissed his revision petition and upheld the trial court's finding that he was fit to stand trial.

Read current report and source

5-Day Deadline for DRT Written Statements Sparks High Court Divide

Delhi High Court · Sheikh Rayees

A disagreement has emerged among High Courts over how strictly Debts Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) must enforce the 45-day limit for filing written statements in recovery proceedings.

The Delhi High Court has taken a strict position, holding that the statutory period cannot be extended beyond 45 days. The Telangana and Punjab and Haryana High Courts, however, have recognised circumstances in which a DRT may exercise discretion even after that period has expired.

The issue came before the Delhi High Court in a case involving Nikhil Poddar and Punjab National Bank. A Division Bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Renu Bhatnagar held that while the initial 30-day period for filing a written statement can be extended by another 15 days, no further delay can be condoned.

The Bench treated the 45-day ceiling under Section 19(5)(i) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act as binding.

According to the Court, the provision does not leave room for a tribunal or court to permit a written statement after the outer limit has expired.

The dispute arose after Poddar challenged a Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal decision refusing to take his written statement on record in recovery proceedings brought by PNB.

Poddar had received the complete pleadings and paper book on September 6, 2019, but submitted his written statement on November 26. His side argued that the delay was linked to the time taken by the bank to provide the necessary documents.

The Delhi High Court rejected that explanation, holding that the limitation period began once the complete paper book had been received.

The Bench also declined to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to extend the deadline. It relied on the principle that where a special statute prescribes a specific outer limit, that timeline cannot automatically be overridden by general provisions permitting condonation of delay.

The Delhi High Court's approach is consistent with its earlier ruling in Anita Garg v. State Bank of India, where it held that the expression “not exceeding fifteen days” in the RDB Act confines the DRT's power to the additional 15-day period.

Punjab and Haryana High Court takes a broader approach

The position is different in Punjab and Haryana.

In Shri Shri Ram Gupta v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Sanjiv Berry held that the provisions concerning written statements under the RDB Act, read alongside Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are directory rather than mandatory.

The Court consequently set aside orders refusing to receive written statements and granted the concerned parties one final opportunity to place their pleadings on record.

Telangana High Court recognises DRT discretion

The Telangana High Court has similarly taken the view that the 45-day period does not necessarily strip a DRT of all power to consider a delayed written statement.

In Ravali Industries v. State Bank of India, a Division Bench held that a tribunal had erred in assuming that it had no authority to consider a written statement filed beyond the prescribed period.

At the same time, the Court made it clear that recognising such power does not mean every delay must be accepted. Whether an extension should be granted would depend on the circumstances of the individual case.

That approach was revisited in B Anand v. Agrasen Co-operative Urban Bank, where the Telangana High Court considered both its own earlier decisions and the contrary position adopted by the Delhi High Court.

The contrasting rulings leave DRTs operating under different interpretations of the same statutory timeline, with the key question being whether the 45-day period is an absolute bar or a procedural deadline that can, in appropriate cases, be relaxed.

Read current report and source

Justice PS Koshy to take charge as Acting Chief Justice of Telangana High Court

Telangana High Court · Sheikh Rayees

Justice Puthichira Sam Koshy has been appointed as the Acting Chief Justice of the Telangana High Court following the elevation of Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh to the Supreme Court.

The Ministry of Law and Justice issued the appointment notification on Monday under Article 223 of the Constitution, which provides for the appointment of an acting Chief Justice when the office is vacant or the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of the office.

Justice Koshy is expected to assume charge once Justice Singh relinquishes his position as Telangana High Court Chief Justice to take oath as a Supreme Court judge.

Justice Koshy began his judicial career at the Chhattisgarh High Court, where he was appointed an additional judge in September 2013. He was made a permanent judge in March 2016.

He was subsequently transferred to the Telangana High Court in 2023.

His appointment as Acting Chief Justice follows the vacancy created by Justice Singh's elevation to the country's highest court.

Read current report and source

Court-Ordered Fixed Deposits Cannot Face Arbitrary Interest Cuts, Delhi High Court Rules

Delhi High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Delhi High Court has held that banks cannot simply lower the interest rate on a fixed deposit maintained under a judicial direction without establishing a valid basis for the change.

The ruling came in a dispute involving NatWest Markets PLC and Hero Exports over a fixed deposit worth ₹5.89 crore, which had been created pursuant to orders passed by the High Court during arbitration proceedings.

A Division Bench comprising Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Shail Jain dismissed NatWest's appeal against an earlier order directing the bank to pay interest at a higher rate on the deposit.

The dispute traces back to proceedings between Hero Exports and Tiffins Barrytes, Asbestos and Paints Limited. In 2008, Hero Exports approached the High Court seeking interim protection before the commencement of arbitration.

The Court subsequently directed that ₹8.5 crore belonging to Tiffins Barrytes be secured. Around ₹5.89 crore of that amount was held with ABN Amro Bank, which later became Royal Bank of Scotland and subsequently NatWest Markets PLC.

The High Court directed that the money be placed in a fixed deposit carrying the maximum applicable interest rate.

For several years, the deposit earned interest at rates of 7.75%, 8.25% and 7.75%. However, from January 30, 2018, NatWest reduced the rate to 3.5%.

The move was challenged before the High Court. In 2019, a single judge directed NatWest to deposit the entire amount with the Registrar General and ordered that interest from January 30, 2018, be calculated using the average rate applicable during the preceding three years.

NatWest argued before the Division Bench that its decision was supported by Reserve Bank of India rules allowing commercial banks to determine interest rates on domestic term deposits. The bank also contended that a fixed deposit which matured without renewal could, in certain circumstances, earn interest at the applicable savings bank rate.

The Division Bench was not persuaded.

The Court noted that although banks have discretion to determine interest rates, such discretion is not unrestricted. Banks must apply their rates without discriminating between similarly placed deposits.

NatWest, the Court found, had failed to demonstrate that comparable fixed deposits had also been brought down to the 3.5% rate.

The Bench also noted that there was no evidence that Hero Exports or Tiffins Barrytes had been told that the deposit had matured and needed to be renewed.

Another factor weighed against the bank. NatWest had approached the arbitrator in 2017 seeking permission to move the funds to another bank as it was winding down its operations, but its application did not indicate that the transfer would result in a reduction of the interest rate.

In these circumstances, the Division Bench found no legal or factual error in the single judge's directions and rejected NatWest's appeal.

The ruling reinforces that where a fixed deposit is maintained as part of a court-directed arrangement, a bank cannot treat the interest rate as something it may alter arbitrarily without adequate justification and notice.

Read current report and source