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31 Oct 2026 — The Lawyers' Post — Daily Edition

Saved newspaper edition with 10 court reports.

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  1. Supreme Court Cancels Sentence Suspension For Sarpanch Election Murder Convict
  2. Supreme Court: Failed Relationships Cannot Automatically Be Turned Into Criminal Cases
  3. Supreme Court Rejects Claims Over 550 Acres In Miyapur, Rules Telangana Government Is Lawful Owner
  4. Supreme Court Cancels Bail for Karnataka IPS Officer Accused in Lokayukta Extortion Case
  5. Bombay High Court Invalidates Arrest After Repeated Questioning Without Fresh Material
  6. Gujarat High Court Rejects Insurer’s Licence Defence For Light Goods Vehicle
  7. Madhya Pradesh High Court Orders Officer To Bear Costs For Unlawful Demand
  8. Gujarat High Court Revives Non-Veg Food Ban Around Somnath Temple Hours After Single-Judge Verdict
  9. J&K High Court Invalidates Water Charges on Hydropower Projects, Calls Levy an Unconstitutional Tax
  10. Delhi High Court Gives Wrestling Federation Two Weeks to Resolve Vinesh Phogat’s Disciplinary Notices

Supreme Court Cancels Sentence Suspension For Sarpanch Election Murder Convict

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 27 October 2026 cancelled the suspension of a life sentence imposed on the principal accused in a sarpanch-election murder conspiracy.

Judge / Bench — Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

Partly allowing Hanuman Prasad @ Hanuta Ram’s appeals, the Court directed accused A1 to surrender within two weeks, failing which apprehension proceedings must follow. It left the other respondents’ sentence suspensions undisturbed because the evidence against them differed.

The Court said appeal backlogs cannot alone justify releasing people convicted of heinous offences. Courts must assess the prima facie evidence, actual imprisonment, likely delay and victims’ interests. Its observations would not govern the pending appeals.

Advocates appearing — Appellant: Rishi Matoliya, AoR. State: Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Counsel. A1: Abhishek Gupta, AoR. A2, A8 and A10: Vikas Verma, AoR.

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Supreme Court: Failed Relationships Cannot Automatically Be Turned Into Criminal Cases

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the criminal justice system cannot become a tool for judging the personal choices of consenting adults, observing that even decisions which lead to painful or undesirable consequences do not automatically amount to criminal offences. A Bench comprising Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice R Mahadevan made the observations while quashing criminal proceedings against a man accused of rape on the false promise of marriage, cheating and bigamy. The allegations arose from a relationship in which the woman claimed that the man had concealed his existing marriage and presented himself as unmarried before marrying her. Emphasising the importance of individual autonomy, the Court said adults are free to make decisions about their personal relationships, whether those decisions turn out to be sensible or reckless. The consequences of such choices, however unpleasant, cannot by themselves invite criminal prosecution. The Bench cautioned against using criminal law as a means of settling personal disputes, seeking revenge or pressuring someone into acting in a particular manner. The Court noted that the woman discovered within six months of the relationship that the man was already married and had children. Despite learning this, she continued living with him for approximately seven years. According to the Bench, this circumstance weakened her assertion that she had continued the relationship under the genuine belief that she was his legally wedded wife. After examining the circumstances, the Court found that the relationship and the physical intimacy were consensual. The man's subsequent decision to walk away from the relationship, by itself, could not establish an offence of rape under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code.

Supreme Court flags growing misuse of criminal proceedings

The Bench also expressed concern over what it described as an increasing tendency to convert failed consensual relationships into criminal cases. It observed that such disputes frequently end in settlements involving substantial monetary payments by the male accused, raising concerns about the use of criminal proceedings to exert pressure in personal conflicts. The Court said the trend was particularly troubling despite repeated judicial warnings against turning relationship disputes into criminal litigation.

Court recognises situations where consent may be vitiated

At the same time, the Supreme Court was careful not to dilute the seriousness of genuine allegations of rape and sexual assault. It acknowledged that sexual violence remains significantly underreported and that cases supported by evidence of assault must be pursued with seriousness. The Bench also recognised the social and cultural significance of marriage in India, noting that a woman may agree to physical intimacy because she genuinely believes the relationship is based on an existing or promised legally recognised marriage. In such circumstances, marriage may form the very foundation of her decision to enter into a sexual relationship, making her consent dependent on the assurance that the relationship has the legal and social legitimacy represented by her partner. The Court explained that if a woman is genuinely kept unaware of her partner's existing marriage, the deception could potentially invalidate her consent. In such cases, the protective provisions of the IPC, including Sections 376, 493, 494 and 495, must remain available. However, the Bench stressed that determining whether consent was obtained through deception requires a careful examination of the facts and evidence in each individual case. Criminal liability cannot be founded merely on allegations or moral assumptions. The ruling draws a distinction between genuine sexual offences involving deception and relationships that simply collapse after adults make consensual personal choices.

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Supreme Court Rejects Claims Over 550 Acres In Miyapur, Rules Telangana Government Is Lawful Owner

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Supreme Court has firmly rejected competing ownership claims over more than 550 acres of land in Miyapur, Telangana, ruling that the property belongs to the State government and cannot be claimed on the strength of erstwhile jagirdari rights. A bench comprising Justice MM Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dismissed the appeals challenging a 2003 Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment, which had recognised the government's ownership of the disputed land. In a significant clarification on the legal consequences of abolishing jagirs, the Court held that the position of a jagirdar did not confer ownership of the land. Rather, it represented a limited entitlement connected with the collection of land revenue, which came to an end when the jagirs were abolished in 1949. The bench described the circumstances surrounding the competing claims as a "sorry state of affairs", observing that attempts were being made to take over land that had already vested in the State.

How the ownership dispute unfolded

The disputed property, measuring approximately 550 acres and 39 guntas, was classified as Sarkari Poramboke, or government land, following a survey of Miyapur village in 1912. The claimants relied on three different historical sources to establish ownership. One group traced its claim to Nawab Mohammad Khaisaruddin Khan, son of Rafi-un-nisa Begum, who was recommended by the Reilly Commission in 1927 for restoration of Miyapur and certain other villages. Another claimant relied on the name of Raheemunnisa Begum, wife of Abdul Salam, appearing as a pattadar in revenue records covering the years 1950-51 to 1952-53. A third claim was based on a 1929 Firman, an official order, issued in connection with Raheemunnisa Begum, wife of Nawab Moinuddowla Bahadur. However, the Supreme Court found that these historical references and documents could not establish ownership in the face of the statutory abolition of jagirdari rights.

Abolition of jagirs changed the legal position

The Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli, came into force on August 15, 1949. The administration of jagirs was subsequently transferred to the Hyderabad government from September 15 that year. Khaisaruddin Khan later initiated proceedings under the Hyderabad Atiyat Inquiries Act, 1952, and secured provisional and revised commutation awards in 1957 and 1958. The Board of Revenue also issued a Muntakhib in 1976 covering four villages, including Miyapur. However, a subsequent application by his son seeking the release of the villages was rejected in 1995. The Court examined these proceedings and clarified that the statutory framework did not preserve ownership rights over the land merely because an individual had previously held jagirdari status or obtained a commutation award.

Jagirdari status cannot be equated with land ownership

Explaining the distinction between a Paigah and a jagir, the bench observed that a Paigah represented an estate granted for maintaining an army, while a jagir concerned rights associated with land revenue. Consequently, a jagir grant could not be interpreted as a transfer of ownership of the underlying property. The Court further explained that a jagirdar held the position at the pleasure of the Nizam and did not automatically acquire an inheritable title to the land. The abolition regulation also removed the jagirdar's status from the date it came into operation. Under Regulation 6, jagirs were brought within the Diwani administration, resulting in the cessation of the jagirdar's powers, rights and liabilities. The bench also addressed the exceptions concerning home farms and personal properties under Regulations 17 and 18. It made clear that anyone claiming the benefit of these exceptions must establish that the property genuinely falls within those categories. The burden of proof, the Court said, rests on the person asserting such an exception.

Commutation awards do not establish ownership

The Supreme Court also considered the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation alongside the Atiyat Inquiries Act and the Jagirs Commutation Rules. It concluded that the entitlement of former jagirdars or Muntakhib holders was restricted to receiving the commutation amount. Such payments were one-time compensation for the abolition of jagirdari rights and could not be treated as recognition of ownership over the properties concerned. The bench further held that the 1929 Firman itself imposed restrictions on the nature of the jagirdari grant. It therefore could not serve as the foundation for an independent claim of title. Whatever limited rights existed under the Firman were subsequently extinguished by the statutory abolition of jagirs.

Supreme Court upholds government's ownership

The dispute had also resulted in multiple proceedings before the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. In two cases where the State government had not been impleaded, the respondents were declared land grabbers. In separate proceedings involving the government, the disputed properties were classified as poramboke land belonging to the State, and the opposing parties were declared land grabbers. The Andhra Pradesh High Court subsequently upheld the findings in the latter cases, overturned the earlier decisions and declared the State government the lawful owner. The Supreme Court has now refused to interfere with that determination, dismissing the appeals and affirming the government's ownership of the disputed Miyapur properties. The ruling reinforces an important distinction in property law: historical possession of a jagir, revenue-related privileges or the receipt of compensation following its abolition cannot, by themselves, establish ownership of the land.

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Supreme Court Cancels Bail for Karnataka IPS Officer Accused in Lokayukta Extortion Case

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Supreme Court has withdrawn anticipatory bail granted to IPS officer Srinath Joshi Mahadev, who is facing allegations of involvement in an extortion racket linked to the Karnataka Lokayukta Police. The officer has been directed to surrender within three weeks. While overturning the Karnataka High Court's decision, a Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva pointed to what it described as a striking contradiction: an officer serving in an institution established to fight corruption was himself facing accusations of corrupt practices. The Bench observed that the Lokayukta was created to tackle corruption, making allegations of an officer's involvement in such activities particularly serious and deserving of closer examination. The Supreme Court passed its order on October 29 while hearing an appeal filed by the Lokayukta Police against the High Court's September 2025 decision granting Mahadev protection from arrest. The judges said the evidence gathered during the investigation required further scrutiny and that the High Court had acted prematurely by ruling out the possibility of custodial interrogation. The Court also made it clear that Mahadev would have to surrender within three weeks. However, he would retain the right to approach the appropriate forum for regular bail in accordance with the law. The Bench took note of Mahadev's position as a senior police officer, pointing out that he held the rank of Superintendent of Police. It said allegations involving misuse of official authority by someone in such a position could not be viewed in the same manner as claims involving an ordinary individual seeking protection from arrest.

How the alleged extortion network came under investigation

The case stems from an FIR registered in June 2025 under the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to the allegations, Ningappa Savantha, a police constable who had been dismissed from service over unauthorised absence, allegedly impersonated an official attached to the Lokayukta office. He was accused of demanding money from public servants by threatening them with action. Although Mahadev was not named in the initial FIR, investigators subsequently brought him into the case following disclosures made by Savantha. The prosecution had alleged that the two men were in contact and that Savantha regularly visited the Lokayukta office to meet the IPS officer. Mahadev's anticipatory bail application had already been rejected twice by the trial court, first in June and again in July 2025. He subsequently approached the Karnataka High Court, which granted him protection. The High Court had relied on the fact that Mahadev appeared before the investigating officer after receiving a notice and had not been arrested, concluding that there was no immediate reason to believe he would face arrest.

Damaged phones raise questions over investigation

Another significant aspect highlighted before the Supreme Court concerned two mobile phones seized from Mahadev. The prosecution informed the Bench that both devices had been tampered with and extensively damaged. Their forensic examination was still pending when the High Court granted anticipatory bail. Taking these circumstances into account, the Supreme Court concluded that the investigation required a more thorough examination and that the possibility of custodial questioning should not have been ruled out at that stage. With its latest decision, the Supreme Court has reversed the relief granted by the High Court, bringing Mahadev's anticipatory bail protection to an end.

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Bombay High Court Invalidates Arrest After Repeated Questioning Without Fresh Material

Bombay High Court · Editorial Team

The Bombay High Court on 27 October 2026 declared Jitendra Pandey’s money-laundering arrest illegal and ordered his immediate release.

Judge / Bench — Justice Milind N. Jadhav.

The Court found no fresh incriminating material justifying arrest after repeated statements and the Enforcement Directorate’s invocation of Section 50 procedures. On these facts, it held that the agency could not abandon that course and invoke Section 19 on the same material.

The arrest-related remand orders were quashed. The Court refused the ED’s request for a two-week stay. The ruling concerned arrest legality, rather than final determination of the allegations.

Advocates appearing — Petitioner: Ravindra Kadam, Senior Advocate, with Shrey S. Lodha, Dulraj Jain, Aryan Kotwal, Anjali Joshi, Hrutik Chavan and Aarti Nishad, instructed by D’vocate Legal LLP. ED: C.R. Pendse with Atharva S. Jagtap and Amit Mane. State: Amit Munde, APP.

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Gujarat High Court Rejects Insurer’s Licence Defence For Light Goods Vehicle

Gujarat High Court · Editorial Team

The Gujarat High Court on 29 October 2026 dismissed Oriental Insurance’s appeal against a fatal-accident compensation award, rejecting its objection to the driver’s licence.

Judge / Bench — Justice L. S. Pirzada.

The driver held a valid non-transport light-motor-vehicle licence, although his transport endorsement had expired. The offending vehicle was a light goods vehicle with gross weight not exceeding 7,500 kilograms.

Applying the Supreme Court’s licensing rulings, the Court found the existing LMV licence sufficient for that vehicle. It confirmed the ₹9.48 lakh award with nine per cent annual interest and disposed of the connected disbursement application.

Advocates appearing — Appellant: Masumi V Nanavaty with Vibhuti Nanavati. Defendants 3–6: Spruha Joshi for Tirth Nayak; Tirth Nayak also addressed the Court. Defendants 1–2: Not named in the judgment.

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Madhya Pradesh High Court Orders Officer To Bear Costs For Unlawful Demand

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Editorial Team

The Madhya Pradesh High Court on 28 October 2026 imposed ₹1 lakh costs after Indore Municipal Corporation relied on statutory provisions omitted in 2020.

Judge / Bench — Justice Sandeep N. Bhatt, Indore Bench.

In Bafgna Hospital’s petition, the Corporation agreed to withdraw its 30 September order and subsequent ledger report as legally unsustainable. The Court treated them as non-existent but said withdrawal did not excuse the officer’s failure to apply existing law.

The authority must pay ₹75,000 to the M.P. Legal Services Authority, Indore, and ₹25,000 to the petitioner within seven days. The Corporation’s highest officer must ensure recovery from the erring officer within fifteen days of payment. Fresh proceedings remain permissible according to law.

Advocates appearing — Petitioner: Vibhor Khandelwal with Jayesh Gurnani, Advocates. Respondent: Manoj Munshi, Senior Advocate, with Shashank Shrivastava and Vikram Malviya, Advocates.

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Gujarat High Court Revives Non-Veg Food Ban Around Somnath Temple Hours After Single-Judge Verdict

Gujarat High Court · Sheikh Rayees

In a dramatic turn of events, the Gujarat High Court has reinstated restrictions on the preparation, sale and storage of non-vegetarian food around the Somnath Temple, overturning the effect of a single-judge ruling that had struck down the prohibition just hours earlier. A division bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Manash Ranjan Pathak and Justice Nirzar S Desai stayed the single-judge order and directed that the Gujarat government's notification imposing the ban would continue to operate until further orders. The rapid reversal followed an appeal filed by the State government shortly after Justice Nisha M Thakore delivered her judgment on October 30. The division bench took up the matter at around 5:30 pm, approximately two-and-a-half hours after the single-judge pronounced her decision. Interestingly, the earlier judgment had not even appeared on the High Court's official website when the State's appeal came up for consideration.

Ban Covers Seven Locations, Including 500-Metre Temple Zone

The controversy began with a preliminary notification issued by the Gir Somnath District Magistrate on July 10, proposing restrictions on the preparation, sale and storage of meat, fish and other non-vegetarian food. After inviting objections, the administration issued its final notification on August 10, extending the prohibition to seven identified stretches and locations. The restrictions specifically covered areas falling within a 500-metre radius of the Somnath Temple, along with designated shops, hotels, restaurants and roadside food stalls. Restaurant owners operating in the affected areas approached the High Court, arguing that the District Magistrate had exceeded his statutory powers by imposing a complete prohibition on their business activities. Justice Nisha M Thakore accepted their challenge on October 30 and set aside the notification. The decision prompted the State government to immediately approach a division bench.

Single-Judge Says Regulation Cannot Become A Complete Prohibition

While striking down the restrictions, Justice Thakore drew a distinction between regulating commercial activities and eliminating them altogether. She held that authorities could introduce reasonable controls over the preparation, storage and sale of non-vegetarian food, but such regulatory powers could not be used to impose an outright ban. The judgment also rejected the argument that prohibiting non-vegetarian food was necessary to safeguard the religious sentiments of Hindu devotees. Pointing to the diversity of religious practices and dietary choices within Hinduism, the single-judge observed that food preferences could not be treated as a uniform religious requirement. "Hinduism is not monolithic but the choice or ritual of consuming food varies region wise," the Court observed, adding that eating non-vegetarian food was essentially a matter of personal choice rather than an essential religious practice. The judgment further emphasised that the power to regulate an activity necessarily presupposes that the activity itself continues to exist.

State Cites Festival Rush And Religious Sentiments

Challenging the decision, the Gujarat government argued before the division bench that allowing non-vegetarian food establishments to operate in the restricted areas could create difficulties during the upcoming Diwali holidays and Gujarati New Year celebrations. Advocate General Kamal Trivedi submitted that large numbers of devotees were expected to visit Somnath Temple and neighbouring religious locations during the festive period. The State maintained that the presence and consumption of meat and fish in these areas could hurt devotees' religious sentiments and potentially lead to inconvenience, public annoyance and risks to the temple premises and surrounding religious sites. The government also questioned the legality of the single-judge's decision, relying on earlier judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts to support its position that such restrictions could be imposed under the law.

Division Bench Puts Earlier Judgment On Hold

Taking note of the State's submissions and the expected influx of devotees during the festive season, the division bench granted interim relief. It ordered that the District Magistrate's August 10 notification would remain operative, while the single-judge's judgment would stay suspended until further orders. The bench also directed the restaurant owners to file their responses and ordered that the State's appeal be heard alongside a petition dating back to 2018. The matter has been scheduled for its next hearing on November 25. The interim order means that the restrictions on non-vegetarian food around Somnath Temple will continue for now, despite the earlier ruling that had declared the blanket prohibition unsustainable.

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J&K High Court Invalidates Water Charges on Hydropower Projects, Calls Levy an Unconstitutional Tax

Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has struck down the imposition of water usage charges on hydropower projects under the Jammu and Kashmir Water Resources (Regulation and Management) Act, 2010, ruling that the levy effectively amounted to a tax on electricity generation. A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajnesh Oswal and Justice Sanjay Dhar held that the State Legislature lacked the constitutional authority to impose such a tax. It declared the relevant provisions of the 2010 legislation unconstitutional to the extent that they imposed water usage charges on hydroelectric power producers. The Court observed that the levy, despite being described as a charge for water usage, was essentially a tax on the process of generating electricity. At the heart of the dispute was whether the government could collect money from hydropower operators for using river water to generate electricity when the levy was not linked to any specific service or benefit provided to them. Examining Section 185-A of the 2010 Act, the Bench found that the money collected from hydropower projects was earmarked for broader government purposes. These included establishing new hydel projects, buying back existing hydroelectric projects, investing in transmission and distribution infrastructure, and purchasing electricity for the State. The Court noted that the funds were not being used to provide any direct benefit to the project operators. Consequently, the essential element of quid pro quo, which distinguishes a regulatory fee from a tax, was absent. The Bench concluded that the so-called water usage charges were, in substance, a tax rather than a fee for a service. It further explained that water utilisation is inseparable from the process of generating hydroelectricity. Although water is not consumed in the conventional sense during hydropower generation, its use is indispensable to producing electricity. Accordingly, any statutory levy imposed on water utilisation during the power-generation process effectively operates as a tax on electricity generation itself. The constitutional question turned on Entry 53 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, which gives State Legislatures the authority to impose taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity. However, the provision does not extend to taxation of electricity generation. The Bench held that the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir had exceeded its legislative powers by introducing such a levy through the 2010 legislation. The government had defended the charges by relying on Entry 17 of List II, which deals with water and water-related matters, including water power projects. It argued that this constitutional entry empowered the State to regulate water usage and collect charges from hydropower operators. The government also maintained that the legal position had changed following the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. Since Parliament had provided for the adoption of existing State laws in the newly created Union Territories, it argued that the 2010 legislation could be treated as having parliamentary backing. The High Court rejected both submissions. On the argument concerning the 2019 Reorganisation Act, the Bench clarified that the continuation of an existing State law in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh did not transform it into legislation enacted by Parliament. It further ruled that a law which was unconstitutional from the outset because the legislature lacked the necessary authority could not acquire constitutional validity simply through its subsequent adoption. The judgment came in response to three petitions filed by independent power producers operating river-based hydroelectric projects in Jammu and Kashmir. They had challenged the statutory provisions imposing water usage charges, along with the rules framed under the legislation and the demand notices issued to recover the amounts. Allowing the petitions, the High Court quashed the water usage levy imposed under the 2010 Act and the corresponding rules. It also set aside the demand notices issued against the petitioners. The Bench further restrained the government from imposing any tax on electricity generation under the guise of water usage charges or through any other form of levy. The ruling draws a clear constitutional boundary between the State's authority to regulate water resources and its power to impose taxes on electricity. It makes clear that a charge cannot escape constitutional scrutiny merely because it is given a regulatory label when its actual character is taxation of power generation.

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Delhi High Court Gives Wrestling Federation Two Weeks to Resolve Vinesh Phogat’s Disciplinary Notices

Delhi High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Delhi High Court has given the Wrestling Federation of India (WFI) a two-week deadline to take a decision on the show-cause notices issued to wrestler Vinesh Phogat, bringing some clarity to a dispute that has been hanging over her return to competitive wrestling. Justice Amit Mahajan passed the direction while hearing Phogat’s petition challenging the notices dated May 9 and June 17, which were issued in connection with proposed disciplinary action against her. During the hearing, the Court highlighted the importance of an athlete’s mental well-being, observing that competitors must be in a physically fit and mentally relaxed condition to perform at their best. Uncertainty surrounding disciplinary proceedings, it indicated, should not unnecessarily affect an athlete’s preparation and participation in sporting events. Phogat told the Court that the notices were part of what she described as a continuing pattern of arbitrary and mala fide action by the WFI. According to her, the federation's actions had created obstacles to her efforts to return to elite wrestling following maternity. She also pointed out that the International Testing Agency had already cleared her to compete from January 1, 2026. Despite this clearance, she argued, the pending proceedings continued to create uncertainty over her eligibility, selection and participation in upcoming competitions. The wrestler is particularly keen to compete in a national tournament scheduled for December. She expressed concern that the federation could take an adverse decision before the event, potentially jeopardising her opportunity to return to the competitive circuit. The High Court found her concerns genuine and directed the WFI to decide on the pending notices within two weeks. The Court further clarified that if the federation passes a decision after the two-week period, its implementation must remain on hold until the next hearing. The matter will now come up before the Court on January 20, 2027. Senior Advocate Rajshekhar Rao appeared for Phogat, assisted by advocates Aashita Khanna, Ritwik Prakash, Vishakha Gupta and Neil M Goswami. Advocates Hemant Phalpher and Karishmit Keswarni represented the Wrestling Federation of India.

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