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3 Nov 2026 — The Lawyers' Post — Daily Edition
Saved newspaper edition with 7 court reports.
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- Supreme Court Restores DVC Tariff Ruling, Rejects Belated Review
- Supreme Court Allows Timed Green Cracker Use With Expanded Safety Zones
- Supreme Court: Government Teachers Cannot Demand Inter-District Transfer As A Matter Of Right
- J&K High Court Grants NDPS Bail Amid False Implication Plea And Sampling Doubts
- Allahabad High Court Orders ₹1.25 Lakh Compensation for Five Days of Illegal Police Detention
- Madras High Court: Court Fee Refund Not Available Once Trial Evidence Is Recorded
- Karnataka High Court Clears Way for Kannada Pleadings Before Administrative Tribunal
Supreme Court Restores DVC Tariff Ruling, Rejects Belated Review
Supreme Court · Editorial Team
The Supreme Court on 30 October 2026 overturned a belated review of Damodar Valley Corporation’s tariff treatment, restoring the appellate tribunal’s 17 May 2019 order.
Judge / Bench — J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.; judgment by K. Vinod Chandran, J.
In DVC v Maithan Alloys Limited (2026 INSC 1178), it held that binding precedent settled the sinking-fund issue. Maithan and intervenor SAIL must pay DVC ₹2 lakh and ₹1.5 lakh respectively within a month, with 18% interest upon default.
Advocates appearing — DVC: Vikas Singh and Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Senior Counsel; SAIL: Rajiv Shakdher, Senior Counsel; respondent 1: Rajiv Yadav, AoR. Other respondents: Not named in the judgment.
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Supreme Court Allows Timed Green Cracker Use With Expanded Safety Zones
Supreme Court · Editorial Team
The Supreme Court on 29 October 2026 permitted green crackers on 7–8 November, from 6–7 am and 8–10 pm, while adding educational institutions to 300-metre no-cracker zones. The general prohibition resumes on 9 November.
Judge / Bench — M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.
In Arjun Gopal v Union of India (2026 INSC 1181), the Court prescribed temporary manufacturing and licensed-sale windows, prohibited online sales, and required compliance reports by 14 December.
Advocates appearing — Petitioners: Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Counsel; intervening applicants: J. Sai Deepak, Senior Counsel; Union of India, GNCTD and CAQM: Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General. Amicus curiae — Uttara Babbar.
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Supreme Court: Government Teachers Cannot Demand Inter-District Transfer As A Matter Of Right
Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Supreme Court has made it clear that personal and family circumstances alone cannot guarantee a government teacher an inter-district transfer, particularly when the move involves a change of cadre and could affect the availability of teachers in schools. Emphasising that students must remain at the centre of the education system, the Court observed that transfer policies cannot be used merely to secure convenient postings or advance the professional interests of teachers. A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice K Vinod Chandran delivered the ruling while setting aside contempt proceedings initiated against the Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education.
Dispute Over Transfer From Bahraich To Lucknow
The case arose from a government teacher's request for an inter-district transfer from Bahraich to Lucknow, where her in-laws were residing. The Allahabad High Court had earlier directed the Board to consider her transfer request under Rule 8(2)(d) of the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education (Teachers) (Posting) Rules, 2008. The provision allows certain relaxations for female teachers. The teacher subsequently initiated contempt proceedings, alleging that the Board's Secretary had failed to comply with the High Court's directions. However, the official challenged the proceedings, arguing that the teacher did not meet the prescribed eligibility criteria, having scored below the minimum cut-off required for an inter-district transfer. It was also contended that allowing her transfer would leave the concerned school with fewer teachers than required under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which mandates a prescribed student-teacher ratio.
Women's Transfer Relaxation Cannot Come At Students' Cost
Accepting the Board's submissions, the Supreme Court clarified that the relaxation available to women teachers under Rule 8(2)(d) does not create an unconditional entitlement to an inter-district transfer. The Court noted that the proposed transfer would also involve a change of cadre and could adversely affect the functioning of the school by reducing its teaching strength. It observed that employees across various sectors face difficulties arising from separation from their families. However, such circumstances cannot, by themselves, establish a legal right to an inter-district transfer. The bench observed: “This is a universal problem faced by employees and one cannot, on the mere displacement from the family, claim an inter-district transfer, which in the present case also entails a cadre change; as a matter of right.” The Court further underscored that the education system must prioritise students' interests over the convenience of teachers. “Every teacher should remember that the educational system is primarily for the students and not to further the career of the teachers or to enable convenient postings to the teachers,” the bench remarked.
Contempt Proceedings Set Aside
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that had held the Board's Secretary prima facie guilty of contempt. The ruling reinforces the principle that transfer requests must be assessed in light of applicable service rules, staffing requirements and the broader interests of students. A family-related hardship, by itself, does not create an enforceable right to an inter-district posting.
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J&K High Court Grants NDPS Bail Amid False Implication Plea And Sampling Doubts
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court · Editorial Team
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has granted bail to Altaf Ahmad Shah in an NDPS case in which he alleged false implication following an altercation between his advocate sister and the then Station House Officer.
Justice Sanjay Parihar recorded the defence’s contention that the case arose from that alleged animosity. Counsel also submitted that a prosecution witness had admitted falsely informing police against Shah and had not supported the prosecution during trial.
The Court left the competing versions concerning false implication and alleged misuse of an advocate sticker for determination at trial, without expressing a final opinion.
The bail decision centred on uncertainty over the prosecution’s commercial-quantity claim. Police allegedly recovered 15 bottles of suspected codeine-based cough syrup and certain Tapentadol tablets from Shah’s vehicle.
Nine bottles carried printed labels and batch numbers; six did not. One bottle from each group underwent forensic examination, which detected Codeine Phosphate.
The Court questioned extending the result from one unlabelled bottle to the remaining five without material establishing that all six contained an identical substance in identical concentration. It held that Section 37’s stringent restrictions could not, at that stage, prevent consideration of bail.
Applying ordinary bail principles, the Court considered Shah’s custody, the stage of trial and the examination of material witnesses, which reduced concerns about interference with evidence.
Speaking to The Lawyers’ Post, Advocate Arzaan Ahmad Dar, who represented Shah, welcomed the order, saying, “Not only justice is done by the court, justice seems to have been done.”
Shah must furnish a ₹1 lakh personal bond with two sureties of the same amount, attend trial unless exempted, obtain permission before leaving J&K, and refrain from similar offences.
The Court clarified that its observations were confined to bail and would not influence the trial.
Case—Altaf Ahmad Shah v. Union Territory of J&K through P/S Mehraj Gunj
Case number—Bail App No. 33/2026
Bench—Justice Sanjay Parihar
Order dated—October 6, 2026
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Allahabad High Court Orders ₹1.25 Lakh Compensation for Five Days of Illegal Police Detention
Allahabad High Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Allahabad High Court has directed the Uttar Pradesh government to pay ₹1.25 lakh in compensation to a man who was unlawfully kept in police custody for five days, while warning that the investigating officer responsible could face the strictest departmental punishment. A division bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Achal Sachdev came down heavily on the investigating officer, observing that his conduct reflected an alarming disregard for legal procedure and an abuse of official authority. In the case of Gyanti Devi And 2 Others v. State of UP & 3 Others, the Court remarked that the officer's decision to keep the man in custody for five days without following the prescribed legal process appeared to have been treated as routine police practice. The bench made it clear that such conduct could not be overlooked. “If the departmental inquiry establishes the officer's guilt, the harshest punishment should be imposed,” the Court observed.
Compensation Fixed at ₹25,000 Per Day
The Court calculated compensation at ₹25,000 for each day of unlawful detention, bringing the total amount payable to ₹1.25 lakh. It further clarified that the compensation would not prevent the victim from pursuing a separate civil action against the police department to claim additional damages. The bench also directed the State to recover the compensation amount from the police personnel found responsible for the illegal detention following the departmental inquiry.
Man Detained After Eloping With 18-Year-Old Woman
The matter arose from a habeas corpus petition filed by Gyanti Devi, who alleged that her son, Chandan Rajbhar, had been unlawfully detained by the police after he eloped with an 18-year-old woman. An FIR was registered in Deoria under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, alleging that the woman had been kidnapped with the intention of compelling her to marry. Rajbhar was taken into custody by the Salempur police on August 28. However, instead of being formally arrested, he remained in illegal detention until September 2. During the proceedings, the Uttar Pradesh government admitted that the investigating officer, Deep Narayan Yadav, had unlawfully detained Rajbhar for five days. The Deoria Superintendent of Police had already initiated a departmental inquiry against the officer.
Court Appreciates Police Officials Who Uncovered the Facts
The bench also acknowledged the efforts of Circle Officer Rajesh Chaturvedi, whose inquiry report brought the actual circumstances of the detention to light. The Court appreciated the role of Deoria Superintendent of Police Abhijeet R Shankar as well. Taking note of the State's admission and the findings placed before it, the Court accepted the petitioner's allegation of unlawful detention. The habeas corpus petition was accordingly allowed, and the Court directed Rajbhar's release. However, it clarified that the criminal proceedings against him would continue and be decided by the trial court on the basis of the evidence presented. In a separate direction, the Court ordered that an appreciation entry be made in the service records of SP Abhijeet R Shankar and Circle Officer Rajesh Chaturvedi. The ruling underscores that police authority cannot be exercised beyond the boundaries of law, and that unlawful detention may carry financial consequences for both the State and the officials responsible.
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Madras High Court: Court Fee Refund Not Available Once Trial Evidence Is Recorded
Madras High Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Madras High Court has ruled that litigants who settle a civil dispute privately after evidence has been recorded during trial cannot claim a refund of court fees under the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. The Court also raised concerns over the existing law, which allows a full refund when a matter is referred to alternative dispute resolution, even if the settlement eventually fails. In Susheela Kawar v. M Pettu Lakshmi, Justice PB Balaji held that the benefit of a court fee refund cannot be extended to cases where the judicial process has already advanced to the stage of recording evidence. “However, there is no doubt in my mind that a party is not entitled to any refund once evidence is recorded,” the Court observed.
Dispute Over Court Fee Refunds
The ruling came while the High Court was hearing two civil revision petitions challenging trial court orders that denied a full refund of court fees despite the parties having reached private settlements. In one matter, the trial court had allowed a 50% refund after deducting 5% towards administrative expenses. In the other, the refund application had been rejected altogether. The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court's 2021 decision in High Court of Judicature at Madras v. MC Subramaniam, which recognised the entitlement to a full refund of court fees in cases settled privately, even without resorting to the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, Justice Balaji held that the Supreme Court's ruling did not address the stage at which a settlement was reached or the restrictions imposed by Section 69 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees Act.
Evidence Recorded Means No Refund
Under Section 69, court fees may be refunded when a suit is settled outside court before evidence is recorded on the merits of the dispute. Although a 2017 amendment increased the permissible refund from 50% to 100%, the legislature retained the condition relating to the recording of evidence. The High Court explained that court fees contribute towards the functioning of the judicial system, including infrastructure, salaries and trial expenses. Once evidence has been recorded, substantial judicial resources have already been utilised. The Court observed that this was precisely why the restriction under Section 69 continued to remain in force despite the introduction and subsequent amendment of Section 69-A. Justice Balaji also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Pvt. Ltd., which emphasised that alternative dispute resolution should ordinarily be explored before a trial begins. According to the High Court, the decision in MC Subramaniam had not considered the principles laid down in Afcons Infrastructure. The Court therefore held that Section 69-A could not be interpreted so broadly that it effectively rendered Section 69 meaningless. Applying this reasoning, the High Court upheld the denial of a refund in the case where witnesses from both sides, along with a court witness, had already been examined. Both revision petitions were dismissed.
Court Flags Loophole in ADR Refund Provision
Apart from deciding the refund dispute, the High Court raised concerns over Section 69-A, particularly its amended form introduced in 2017. The provision allows a full court fee refund once a dispute is referred to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. However, it does not adequately address what happens when the settlement process fails and the parties return to court for trial. The Court pointed out that the law remains silent on whether litigants must repay the refunded court fees before the trial resumes. “There is no clarity or statutory provision or rule with regard to a situation where a reference to alternate dispute resolution fails and the parties are forced to come back to the court for trial,” the Court observed. The High Court noted that the earlier version of the provision offered a safeguard by issuing a refund certificate, with the actual refund being made only after the dispute was successfully settled. It suggested that the Tamil Nadu State Law Commission examine whether the pre-2017 framework should be restored to protect the State exchequer. A copy of the order was directed to be forwarded to the Tamil Nadu State Law Commission for consideration of the issue. The judgment was delivered by Justice PB Balaji.
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Karnataka High Court Clears Way for Kannada Pleadings Before Administrative Tribunal
Karnataka High Court · Sheikh Rayees
Litigants appearing before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (KAT) can submit applications and other pleadings in Kannada, the Karnataka High Court has ruled, clarifying that the tribunal's procedural rules do not impose a blanket restriction on the use of the regional language. A Division Bench of Justice Ashok S Kinagi and Justice Subramanya Rangarao set aside a June 2025 order of the tribunal that had rejected a Kannada-language application filed by Suryakanth. The High Court held that the tribunal had overlooked a specific provision permitting pleadings to be filed in either Kannada or English. The ruling came in the case of Suryakanth v. KPSC.
Rules permit Kannada, final order must be in English
The High Court examined Rule 3 of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986, alongside Rule 9(iii) of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal Rules of Practice, 1990. Rule 9(iii) expressly provides that pleadings, affidavits, memoranda, document lists and other papers submitted before the tribunal may be typewritten in English or Kannada. The Bench clarified that applications also fall within the scope of pleadings under the provision. Consequently, litigants cannot be barred from filing applications in Kannada. The Court observed that the 1986 Rules further empower the tribunal to permit Kannada to be used during proceedings at its discretion, subject to the requirement that the final order must be delivered in English. “There is no complete embargo on the part of the litigants to file an application in Kannada,” the Bench stated in its October 7 ruling.
Tribunal's rejection challenged
Suryakanth had approached the KAT seeking permission to file his original application in Kannada. The tribunal rejected his request, relying on Rule 3 of the 1986 Rules, which prescribes English as the language of the tribunal. Challenging the decision before the High Court, he argued that the rules permitted the submission of documents in Kannada and also allowed the Bench to authorise the language's use during proceedings. The State government opposed the petition, maintaining that pleadings before the tribunal were required to be presented in English. After examining the relevant provisions, the High Court found that the tribunal had failed to take into account Rule 9(iii) of the 1990 Rules, which specifically recognises Kannada as an accepted language for filing pleadings. The Bench said the petitioner had correctly submitted his application in Kannada and that the tribunal had committed an error by rejecting it without considering the applicable provision.
High Court restores original application
Finding the tribunal's decision legally unsustainable, the High Court allowed Suryakanth's petition and quashed the June 2025 order. It also allowed his interlocutory application seeking permission to file pleadings in Kannada and restored his original application before the tribunal. The KAT was directed to decide the original application in accordance with law. The ruling clarifies that while English remains the language of the final order, Kannada may be used by litigants for filing applications and pleadings before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, in accordance with the governing rules.
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