In a crisp course-correction, the Supreme Court has held that an advocate’s simple announcement of having “no instructions” is not the same as walking away from a case — and therefore does not trigger the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules that require a seven-day notice before withdrawing a vakalatnama.
With that, the Court dismantled a High Court order that had stepped in under Article 227, reminding that supervisory powers are meant for rare lapses of jurisdiction — not for second-guessing factual conclusions already examined meticulously by subordinate courts.
A Landlord’s Case Caught in Procedural Crosswinds
The dispute began as a straightforward eviction suit. The tenants vanished from the proceedings repeatedly, prompting the trial court to move ahead, though an ex parte order was eventually recalled to give them another chance.
Then came the twist: their advocate filed a pursis declaring he had “no instructions,” attaching a notice he claimed to have sent his clients — but crucially, he never asked to withdraw his vakalatnama. The case went on, the plaintiff’s evidence stood untouched, and the trial court finally granted eviction in 2015.
The tenants appealed. The First Appellate Court didn’t buy their story. They couldn’t show they had failed to receive their lawyer’s notice, their conduct was riddled with delay, and the “no instructions” note didn’t amount to a formal withdrawal of appearance. Appeal dismissed.
Running out of rope, they invoked Article 227. The High Court stepped in, faulting the trial court for not applying the procedural rules tied to withdrawal of appearance, and sent the matter back for a fresh hearing.
Supreme Court: The Rules Were Never Triggered
The Supreme Court disagreed — decisively.
Because the advocate never withdrew his vakalatnama and the court never permitted withdrawal, the elaborate framework of seven-day advance notice to the client simply did not apply. A pursis of “no instructions” is not a departure; it is merely a signal that the lawyer cannot proceed without directions.
More damning for the tenants: even after the pursis was filed, the case lay open for months, yet they made no effort to appear, rectify the situation, or appoint new counsel. Their history already included ex parte orders and a pattern of absence.
The Appellate Court had factored all this in. Its conclusions were plausible, reasoned, and grounded in the record — leaving no opening for Article 227 interference.
But the High Court, the Supreme Court said, had launched into procedural rules that were irrelevant to the situation, effectively revisiting the facts and stepping beyond supervisory boundaries.
The Supreme Court’s Word
Once the appellate court had weighed the facts — including the non-withdrawal of the vakalatnama — there was no jurisdictional flaw to correct. The High Court’s intervention was “misconceived” and its fact-reassessment impermissible.
With that, the appeal was allowed, restoring the lower courts’ orders.
