

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY

WRIT PETITION Nos.16935, 17710 AND 17764 OF 2024

COMMON ORDER :

Since the issue in all these writ petitions is same, they are being disposed of, at the admission stage itself, by this common order with the consent of both sides.

2.1. The petitioners in all these writ petitions were appointed as Government Pleaders and Special Government Pleaders, Assistant Government Pleaders, Additional Government Pleaders (hereinafter referred to as 'Law Officers') in various Courts of the District Judiciary during the years 2021 to 2023 for a period of three (3) years on payment of monthly honorarium. By the impugned G.O. Rt. No.354, Law Department, dated 26.06.2024, the Government has discontinued services of the Law Officers herein and others whose names are shown in the list annexed thereto.

2.2. It was stated in G.O. Rt. No.354 that as per proviso to Instruction No.9 of the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and

Conditions of Service) Instructions 2000 issued in G.O. Ms. No.187, Law Department, dated 06.12.2000, the Law Officers are entitled to one month honorarium in lieu of notice. Accordingly, the concerned District Collectors were requested to pay one month honorarium to the Law Officers and make necessary incharge arrangements by placing eligible Advocates as incharge of the post for a period of six (6) months or till regular appointments are made by the Government whichever is earlier. The District Collectors were also directed to furnish panels consisting of five (5) Advocates in each panel forthwith for making regular appointment of new Law Officers. In pursuance of G.O. Rt. No.354 on petitioners and others being discontinued, consequential individual orders have been issued appointing new Law Officers on temporary basis to various Courts in the District Judiciary.

2.3. The case of the petitioners is that they are appointed on a tenure post; they cannot be discontinued *en masse* without giving opportunity of hearing; there is no reason to discontinue their services except for change of Government; they have legitimate expectation to continue till the expiry of their tenure; the impugned

Government Order is patently arbitrary, *mala fide* and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution as the services of the Law Officers are discontinued for extraneous consideration for the only reason of change of Government.

3.1. The case of the respondents is that the Government has discontinued services of 55 Law Officers viz., Government Pleaders, Additional Government Pleaders, Special Government Pleaders, Assistant Government Pleaders and Special Counsel working in the Courts subordinate to the High Court for the State of Telangana who are under first or second term in the entire State in exercise of the powers conferred by Instruction No.9 in G.O. Ms. No.187, in public interest and for effective implementation of the policy of the Government. The concerned District Collectors were requested to make necessary arrangements immediately by placing eligible Advocates as incharge of the post for a period of six (6) months or till regular appointments are made by the Government, whichever is earlier. Consequently, incharge arrangements have been made.

3.2. It is submitted that the Law Officers do not have any 'legally enforceable right' or 'vested right' for their appointment / continuation. There is no violation of statutory or Constitutional right. The terms of appointment and conditions of services of the Law Officers are purely guided by the executive instructions under G.O. Ms. No.187. The order of appointment of the Law Officers clearly stipulates that they are appointed 'for a term of three years from the date of assumption of charge of the post or till termination of their services whichever is earlier.' The Law Officers who have accepted such appointment cannot claim any legitimate expectation to continue.

3.3. It is submitted that the discretion of the State Government in engagement of its Law Officers for effective adjudication, administration of justice and defending the policy matters involve important facets of trust, client-attorney privilege, pleasure and confidence of the Government etc. There is no mandatory rule to call for explanation from the individual before dispensing with the engagement as the termination is a simpliciter termination of client and counsel relationship without attaching any

stigma on the Law Officers. The engagement of Law Officers can be terminated even before expiry of the term when the client considers that they have no confidence upon them or any other reasons. The appointment of Law Officers is as per the pleasure of the Government. Orders issued in G.O. Rt. No.354 is perfectly legal, valid and in accordance with the prevailing rules, instructions and settled legal position. Thus, the Law Officers are not entitled to any relief.

4. Heard Mr. Vedula Venkataramana, learned senior counsel, appearing for M/s. Bharadwaj Associates, learned counsel for the petitioners (Law Officers) in W.P. No.16935 of 2024; Mr. Prasad Pulpoody, learned counsel, representing Mr. C. Kalyan Rao, learned for the petitioners (Law Officers) in W.P. No.17710 of 2024; and Mr. Samala Ravendar, learned counsel for the petitioners (Law Officers) in W.P. No.17764 of 2024; Mr. A. Sudershan Reddy, learned Advocate General appearing for the State; learned Government Pleader for Law and Legislative Affairs; and perused the material on record including G.O. Ms. No.187 and G.O. Rt. No.354.

Submissions made by Mr. Vedula Venkataramana, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No.16935 of 2024 :

5. The three years term of the Law Officers is subsisting, as such, they cannot be prematurely discontinued. *En masse* removal of Government Law Officers is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.**¹. The action of the State is patently illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. There is no complaint against the Law Officers touching upon their performance, trust etc. Disengagement of the Law Officers is not as per the Instructions issued in G.O. Ms. No.187. It is apparent, change of the Government is the discerning ground for disengagement of the services of the Law Officers. Mere existence of power cannot be a ground to exercise such power unless situation warrants. It would not mean that the State can act in an arbitrary or whimsical manner. The action of the State to discontinue the services of the Law Officers without any reason is patently arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of

¹ 1991 (1) SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 742

India. There is no material to point out that all the 55 Law Officers are inefficient and their removal at one go runs contrary to the scheme of fairness, transparency and reasonableness enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Submissions made by Mr. A. Sudershan Reddy, learned Advocate General appearing for the State :

6.1. The petitioners do not have any vested right to continue as Law Officers. The appointment order of the petitioners clearly states that their services can be disengaged before expiry of the term and thus there is no violation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case** (Supra 1). The termination of services of the Law Officers is as per Instruction No.9 of G.O. Ms. No.187. It is not only the Government which can disengage services of the Law Officers, even the Law Officers have discretion to discontinue by giving one month's notice. Thus, there is no discrimination or arbitrary action as contended by the Law Officers. It is mutual contract between the Law Officers and the Government who are having a normal relationship of a counsel and client. In view of the decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in **State of U.P. v. Johri Mal**² which is subsequent in time, the decision in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case** (Supra 1) is no more a good law.

6.2. It is only a contractual relationship between the Law Officers (Advocates) and respondent (client) and nothing more. Instructions issued in G.O. Ms. No.187 are only guidelines for appointment of engaging Law Officers and are not enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the writ petitions are not maintainable.

Reply Submissions made by Mr. Vedula Venkataramana, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No.16935 of 2024 :

7. *En masse* termination will be stigmatic. The Law Officers cannot be necked out as a class and it would be a black spot on them as termination/discontinuation would carry an undisclosed impression that they had been discontinued for misconduct/ incompetency. The respondents have not come out with any reasons in the counter and *en masse* disengagement of the

² (2004) 4 SCC 714

Law Officers would give a colour of condemning the Law Officers and it has a punitive effect. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case** (Supra 1) is not overruled in **Johri Mal's case** (Supra 2). The impugned G.O. will not only carry a label of black spot but also make them non-suitable for future appointment. The *ratio decidendi* in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case** (Supra 1) has binding effect on the issue involved in this case. The action of the Government is illegal and arbitrary and to avoid such repetition and whimsical decisions, it would be appropriate to set aside the *en masse* discontinuance. The disengagement of the Law Officers is fraught with civil consequences, as such, principles of natural justice are required to be followed. Assuming that the services of the Law Officers can be disengaged, individual notices ought to have been issued in adherence to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Submissions made by Mr. P. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P. No.17710 of 2024 :

8. Even assuming that the appointment of the Law Officers is contractual in nature, their termination as lock, stock and barrel

is illegal and violative of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case**. The petitioners are entitled to continue as Law Officers for a period of three years tenure. There is an element of public service and the law officers cannot be treated as private lawyers and shunted out as and when desired.

Submissions made by Mr. Samala Ravender, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P. No.17764 of 2024:

9. The disengagement/discontinuation of the Law Officers is contrary to Instruction No.9 of G.O. Ms. No.187. The said G.O. does not permit *en masse* discontinuance. All the Law Officers were given individual appointment orders. Thus, *en masse* termination by a general order is impermissible under law. Further, honorarium is not paid to many of the Law Officers.

DISCUSSION:

10. Instruction Nos.8 and 9 of G.O. Ms. No.187 which are relevant for this case are as under:

“Term of Law Officers.

8. Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. The Law Officers so appointed may be considered for a second term, if the Government are satisfied that he has proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance and for a third term in exceptional cases:

Provided that Government Pleaders, Assistant Government Pleaders, Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors in Subordinate Courts may be considered for appointment for a second term if their performance is very good and in the case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes if their performance is satisfactory.

Termination of service.

9. Notwithstanding anything contained in instruction 8, either the Government or the Law Officer may terminate the engagement with one month's notice:

Provided that the Government may terminate the engagement by paying one month honorarium in lieu of one month's notice.”

11. The standard format of the order of appointment of all the Law Officers vide G.O.Rt.No.575, Law (F) Department, dated 03.11.2022, is as under:

“ORDER :

... .. , Advocate, is hereby appointed as Government Pleader for the to look after civil cases on behalf of the Government for a term of three years from the date of assumption of charge of the post or till the termination of his services, whichever is earlier. His conditions of service shall be in accordance with the instructions issued in the G.O. first read above as mentioned from time to time.

2. He shall be paid a consolidated honorarium of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) per month, as per the Instructions issued in the G.O. 1st read above.

3. The date of assumption of charge of the post by the above Advocate shall be intimated to the Government.”

12.1. The learned senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on the following paragraphs of the decision in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case** (Supra 1):

“**22.** There is an obvious difference in the contracts between private parties and contracts to which the State is a

party. Private parties are concerned only with their personal interest whereas the State while exercising its powers and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good and in public interest.

43. Non-application of mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments throughout the State of U.P. is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the circular. It is obvious that issuance of the impugned circular was not governed by any rule but by the whim or fancy of someone totally unaware of the requirements of rule of law, neatly spelled out in the case of John Wilkes more than two centuries back and quoted with approval by this Court almost a quarter century earlier in *Jaisinghani case*

44. Conferment of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power is coupled with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. All persons entrusted with any such power have to bear in mind its necessary concomitant which alone justifies conferment of power under the rule of law. This was apparently lost sight of in the present case while issuing the impugned circular.”

12.2. The learned senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners also relied on the decision of a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in **Government of Andhra Pradesh, Law Department v. Battaruseti Chenna Kesawarao**³; relevant paragraphs are as under:

“5. We may also point out that the Government Pleaders are appointed on tenure basis. There is no rule or statutory provision which enjoins upon the Government to terminate their services as and when there is change in the Ruling party. That cannot be a valid ground to terminate their services. Though the power to terminate the services by giving one month notice is available to the Government, but the said power has to be exercised in a *bona fide* manner, uncoupled with the extraneous considerations. The Court is entitled to lift the veil and find out whether valid reasons existed for such termination. Therefore, the contention that the termination of the services by giving one month notice is beyond the reach of judicial review cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court in *Srilekha's* case has clearly spelled out that "without assigning any cause" is not to be equated with "without existence of any cause" though the reasons may not be indicated in the order, but yet the reasons must exist.

³ 1997(2) ALD 554 (D.B.)

Therefore, the termination without existence of any cogent reasons in furtherance of the object for which the power is given was held to be arbitrary and against the public policy. In the said case, the reason for *en masse* termination was that the Government intended streamlining the conduct of the Government cases and effective prosecution thereof, such a reason was held to be drastic and sweeping action. But, however, in the instant case, it is clearly stated that there was no reason except change of Government which we have already held unsustainable.”

13.1. The learned Advocate General relied on the following paragraphs in **Johri Mal’s case** (Supra 2):

“**28.** The Scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the *suprema lex* to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have

adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. The limited scope of judicial review, succinctly put, is :

(i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies.

(ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds.

(iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal.

(iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice.

(v) The courts cannot be called upon to undertake the government duties and functions. The court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies.

(See *Ira Munn v. State of Illinois*, 94 US 113 : 24 L Ed 77 (1876).

36. A writ of or in the nature of mandamus, it is trite, is ordinarily issued where the petitioner establishes a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the public authorities.

37. The Legal Remembrancer Manual clearly states that appointment of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel would be professional in nature. It is beyond any cavil and rightly conceded at the Bar that the holder of an office of the Public Prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post of District Counsel or the Public Prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on the incumbent.”

13.2. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rakesh Kumar Keshari**⁴, wherein it was held as under:

“36. Thus it was not open to the respondents to file writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for compelling the appellants to utilize their services as Advocates irrespective of choice of the State. It was for the State to

⁴ (2011) 5 SCC 341

select its own Counsel. In view of the poor performance of the respondents in handling/conducting criminal cases, this Court is of the opinion that the High Court committed a grave error in giving direction to the District Magistrate to forward better particulars of 10 candidates whose names were included in the two panels prepared pursuant to the advertisement dated 16.1.2004 and in setting aside order dated 7-9-2004 of the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, U.P. calling upon the District Magistrate to send another panel/list for appointment to the two posts of ADGC (Criminal).”

14. It has been held in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case** (Supra 1) that there is a public element involved in appointment of State counsel which is contractual in nature and it is difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14 (**See Paragraph No.28**).

15. The decision in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case** (Supra 1) was considered by a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Johri Mal’s case** (Supra 2) (**See Paragraph No.61**) and expressed its reservations about the principles laid down in **Shrilekha**

Vidyarthi's case (Supra 1) and as discussed above, it was held that the Court has limited power of judicial review over the decisions of administration authorities and the discretion exercised by the authorities cannot be interfered with unless it is perverse or illegal and the Court cannot ordinarily interfere with the policy decision of the State and sit in appeal over administrative decisions (**See paragraph No.28**).

16. The decision in **Johri Mal's case** (Supra 2) was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in **Rakesh Kumar Keshari's case** (Supra 4) and held that the State has discretion to select its own counsel. The *ratio* laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case** (Supra 1) was dealt with by a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in **Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Smt. Pushpendar Kaur**⁵ and the decision of the Government in terminating professional engagement of the aggrieved party by giving one month honorarium in lieu of one month notice by invoking Instruction No.9 of G.O. Ms. No.187 was not interfered

⁵ 2003 SCC Online AP 946 : AIR 2004 AP 41

with holding that the same does not suffer from any legal infirmities.

17. In **Pushendar Kaur's case** (Supra 5), it was held as under:

“24. In the instant case, we have already noticed that no advance notice was given to the writ petitioner as provided in clause 9 of the Instructions, but the appellants sent a cheque to the writ petitioner towards one month's honorarium in lieu of one month's notice, which the writ petitioner declined to accept and returned the cheque. The appellants have scrupulously followed the prescribed procedure and in such a situation the principles of natural justice cannot be pressed into service to invalidate the order.

26. The next question that falls for consideration is as to whether the impugned order of termination of engagement of the writ petitioner as Government Pleader causes any stigma on her professional abilities?

29. In the instant case, the Government merely expressed its intention not to continue the client and Counsel relationship with the writ petitioner. It is under those circumstances, the Government having invoked Clause 9 of the Instructions sent one month's honorarium to the writ petitioner in lieu of one month's notice and accordingly

terminated the professional engagement, which, in our considered opinion, does not suffer from any legal infirmities. The order of termination, in no manner, casts any aspersion or stigma on the professional abilities and integrity of the writ petitioner.

31. In the result, we hold that the impugned order of termination is an order simplicitor terminating the engagement of the writ petitioner as Government Pleader, Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the same, in no manner, casts any stigma as against the writ petitioner. It is a case of simple termination of client and counsel relationship.”

18. A Division Bench of the common High Court for the State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh in **M. Sukravaradhan Reddy v State of Telangana**⁶, held as under:

“It must be borne in mind that the legal profession is essentially a service-oriented profession. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons, and is at liberty to leave him also, for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The lawyer, in turn, is not an agent of his client but his dignified, responsible

⁶ W.P. No.4444 of 2018 dated 25.07.2018

spokesman. The relationship between a lawyer and a private client, is equally valid between him and the Government or public bodies which engage the services of lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period. The nature of the contract is of professional engagement, and not that of employment. The lawyer of the Government or a public body is not its employee, but a professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work. (State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association³; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Pushpindar Kaur⁴). Lawyers, on the full-time rolls of the Government or public bodies cannot be compelled to continue their assignment merely because a particular term is stipulated. A lawyer, whose services have been engaged by the Government, can at any time withdraw from a particular case, and may even refuse to serve in case of any crisis of confidence. (Pushpindar Kaur⁴). Conversely the Government or public bodies can, at their choice, disengage the services of their Counsel.”

19. In Thol. Thirumaavalavan v. Principal Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Tamilandu⁷, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held as under:

⁷ 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 7756

“24. The relationship between an advocate and his client is *uberrima fides*, i.e., one of active confidence and trust. The government is the custodian of public interest. It is the obligation and the duty of the government to protect the public interest to its optimum extent and in the best possible manner. This duty mandates the government to engage the most proficient, competent and capable persons to represent it, *inter alia*, the public interest. Ergo, in the selection of Law Officers, the government is duty bound to make earnest efforts to choose the best. In view of that, while selecting the Law Officers, merit ought to be the sole consideration. The methodology adopted for selecting the Law Officers naturally has to be transparent and the invitation of the applications should be broad-based, so as to enable the government to select the most competent, capable and meritorious lawyers to represent it as Law Officers. Eventually, they would be safeguarding the public interest.

25. The relationship between the government and the Law Officer is purely a professional relationship and not that of a master and servant. The Law Officers engaged by the government, during their performance of the duty, are not holding any civil post. They are also not government servants and/or government employees. The appointment of these Law Officers is at the pleasure of the government. The *sine qua non* is that the Law Officers selected by the government should be duly qualified, competent and worthy

to represent it. The determination of their engagement is also at the pleasure of the government. So also, the Law Officer engaged by the government has a right to terminate his services with the government. It cannot be said that their appointment is a tenure appointment.”

20. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Courts in the decisions cited above, it is very clear that the relationship between the petitioners/Law Officers and the respondent - State is purely professional and contractual. Law Officer is not a civil post. The appointment of a Law Officer cannot be equated with that of the Government employment. The individual appointment orders of the petitioners reveal that they can be terminated before expiry of their term. It is not as if the Law Officers were appointed with a guarantee of tenure.

21. The submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that discontinuation of the Law Officers would be a stigma for their future appointment is not convincing in as much as the disengagement of the petitioners is by way of simplicitor order and not with any negative reasons.

In **Pushpendar Kaur's case** (Supra 5), a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh dealt with similar point and rejected the contention of the petitioner therein (**See Paragraph No.31**). It is contended that *en masse* removal of the Law Officers merely because change of Government is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even looking from the angle of change of Government, it needs to be seen that the Law Officers who are basically engaged to represent the Government and take care of the Government's interest should enjoy the trust and confidence of the Government. The Government being the client is the best person to appoint its counsel.

22. In case of an Advocate holding a private brief, the client need not give any reason for withdrawing the *vakalat*. Thus, it would be unreasonable to deprive the Government of such freedom and discretion to appoint counsel of its choice. It is the contention of the learned Advocate General that the Government as a policy decision has decided to disengage services of the Law Officers who were appointed during the previous regime. Though

the petitioners allege *mala fides* against the Government, such allegations are vague, without any material and substance. The appointment/engagement of the petitioners/Law Officers being purely contractual, it cannot be held that there is any illegality in termination of their services in view of proviso to Instruction No.9 of G.O. Ms. No.187. In the opinion of this Court, if the Government does not have freedom to appoint counsel of its choice, it would amount to placing fetters on their decisions and thereby cause interference in the administration (**Johri Mal's case** - Supra 2). Moreover, the petitioners do not have any enforceable right to be continued as Law Officers as their disengagement was in accordance with proviso to Instruction No.9 of G.O. Ms. No.187 (**Pushpendar Kaur's case** - Supra 5 and **M. Sukravaradhan Reddy's case** - Supra 6).

23. Assuming that *en masse* removal of the petitioners was improper, it needs to be noted that their services were disengaged by a general order directing the District Collectors concerned to pay one month's honorarium as per proviso to Instruction No.9 of G.O. Ms. No.187. If the general order vide G.O. Rt. No.354 is set

aside, nothing prevents the Government to terminate the services of the petitioners by giving individual notices. Thus, even if relief is granted to the petitioners, it would be a mere formality. In such a scenario, the interference by this Court is unwarranted and always avoidable. Thus, there is no merit in these writ petitions.

24. During the course of hearing, it was brought to the notice of this Court that arrears of salary of some of the petitioners were not paid and honorarium was also not received by few of them. It is needless to state that arrears of salary, if any, and honorarium shall be paid to the petitioners and other Law Officers whose services were disengaged by G.O. Rt. No.354.

25. With the above observations and directions, these writ petitions are dismissed, at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in these writ petitions stand closed.

August 19, 2024.
PV

B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J

**IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
HYDERABAD**

W.P. Nos.16935, 17710 AND 17764 OF 2024

Between:

Mr. Nagaram Anjaiah & others .. Petitioners

v.

The State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Secretary,
Legal, Legislative Affairs & Justice Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad & others .. Respondents

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 19-08-2024

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals. : Yes
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish
to see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes

B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J

*** HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY**

+ W.P. Nos.16935, 17710 AND 17764 OF 2024

% Date: 19-08-2024

Mr. Nagaram Anjaiah & others .. Petitioners

v.

\$ The State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Secretary,
Legal, Legislative Affairs & Justice Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad & others .. Respondents

! Counsel for Petitioners : Mr. Vedula Venkataramana, Sr. Counsel,
for M/s. Bharadwaj Associates
Mr. Prasad Pulpoody, learned counsel,
for Mr. C. Kalyan Rao, learned counsel.
Mr. Samala Ravendar, learned counsel.

^ Counsel for respondents : Mr. A. Sudershan Reddy,
Advocate General
G.P. for Law & Legislative Affairs

> **HEAD NOTE:**

? **CASES REFERRED:**

1. 1991 (1) SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 742
2. (2004) 4 SCC 714
3. 1997(2) ALD 554 (D.B.)
4. (2011) 5 SCC 341
5. 2003 SCC Online AP 946 : AIR 2004 AP 41
6. W.P. No.4444 of 2018 dated 25.07.2018
7. 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 7756

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