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17 Oct 2026 — The Lawyers' Post — Daily Edition

Saved newspaper edition with 18 court reports.

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  1. Supreme Court Rejects Automatic Reservation Status After Religious Conversion
  2. Supreme Court Rejects Possession Suit Over Unregistered Property Agreement
  3. Supreme Court Orders Fresh Auction of Chandigarh Hospital Site
  4. Supreme Court Limits Homebuyer Recovery After Full Refund
  5. Supreme Court Allows Private Complaints Over False Election Affidavits
  6. Supreme Court Says Children Cannot Be Shut Out of Internet in the Name of Online Safety
  7. Supreme Court Strikes Down Tamil Nadu’s Gift of Temple Land, Orders Higher Rent
  8. Delhi High Court Says Women Can Face Gang-Rape Charges
  9. Kerala High Court Separates Temporary Fireworks Shops From Permanent Rules
  10. Madhya Pradesh High Court Recognises Electricity as Part of Right to Life
  11. Delhi High Court Rejects Trademark Theory Against Social Media Criticism
  12. Madras High Court Orders CCTV Surveillance Across Tamil Nadu’s TASMAC Liquor Outlets
  13. Allahabad High Court: Section 69 BNS Does Not Cover Transgender Women in False Marriage Promise Cases
  14. Wife’s Death, Confusion Over Election Duty: High Court Quashes Haryana Teacher’s Suspension
  15. Delhi High Court Closes Review Bid by Suspended Chandigarh DRT Presiding Officer
  16. Gujarat High Court Protects Reliance’s Jamnagar Land Deal, Rejects Claim Filed 33 Years After Cancellation
  17. Gujarat High Court Prioritises Women’s Convenience in Matrimonial Case Transfers
  18. Delhi High Court Strikes Down Educomp Fraud Probe, Faults Government’s Reliance on Unverified Material

Supreme Court Rejects Automatic Reservation Status After Religious Conversion

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 15 October upheld the quashing of a Tamil Nadu order that allowed certain converts to Islam to obtain Backward Class Muslim certificates. Conversion alone does not establish membership in any of the State’s seven notified Muslim communities, and a person’s pre-conversion caste status cannot automatically be carried across. Community certificates are declaratory, while private religious bodies cannot conclusively determine statutory reservation entitlement.

Judge / Bench — Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar. Judgment authored by Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra.

Advocates appearing — For the State of Tamil Nadu — Mukul Rohatgi and Sidharth Luthra, Senior Counsel. For the respondents — Not named in the judgment.

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Supreme Court Rejects Possession Suit Over Unregistered Property Agreement

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 16 October dismissed a decades-old suit concerning a Friends Colony plot in Delhi. It held that a suit for possession alone was time-barred and untenable where a serious dispute clouded title. An agreement to sell conveys no ownership without a registered sale deed, and the claimants neither sought cancellation or specific performance nor satisfied the requirements for protection through part performance.

Judge / Bench — Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi. Judgment authored by Justice Aravind Kumar.

Advocates appearing — For the appellants — Not named in the judgment. For the respondents — Not named in the judgment.

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Supreme Court Orders Fresh Auction of Chandigarh Hospital Site

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 16 October set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court ruling that restored a ₹12.58 crore bid for a Chandigarh nursing-home site. The administration had cancelled that result after the adjacent plot fetched ₹18.25 crore; a later auction produced ₹18.30 crore. Holding that a public authority may revisit an auction to maximise value before an enforceable contract arises, the Court ordered a fresh e-auction within three months.

Judge / Bench — Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe.

Advocates appearing — For the private appellant — Guru Krishna Kumar, Senior Counsel. For Chandigarh Administration — Vikramjit Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General. For Bedi Hospital — P. S. Patwalia, Senior Counsel.

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Supreme Court Limits Homebuyer Recovery After Full Refund

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 15 October modified a consumer-forum order arising from delayed possession in a Hyderabad housing project. It directed payment of ₹1.27 crore with 12% interest and ₹15 lakh compensation to the buyer, while retaining the balance pending the lender’s commercial appeal. The Court held that a buyer cannot receive interest on the full refund and rent for the same delay; the bank’s tripartite-agreement claim must be decided separately.

Judge / Bench — Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe. Judgment authored by Justice Alok Aradhe.

Advocates appearing — For the buyer — Amit Anand Tiwari, Senior Counsel. For the builder — Gaurav Agarwal, Senior Counsel, and Rahul Kripalani. For the bank — Suhasini Sen.

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Supreme Court Allows Private Complaints Over False Election Affidavits

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 16 October held that voters may file private complaints alleging false disclosures in candidate affidavits under Section 125-A of the Representation of the People Act. Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not reserve such complaints to the Election Commission or a public servant. The Court nevertheless upheld the quashing of this complaint because the documents rebutted the residential-address allegation and a conviction appeared remote.

Judge / Bench — Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu. Judgment authored by Justice Dipankar Datta.

Advocates appearing — For the appellant — Meenakshi Arora, Senior Counsel, assisted by Kamat, Senior Counsel. For the respondent — Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Senior Counsel, assisted by Akhila Wali.

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Supreme Court Says Children Cannot Be Shut Out of Internet in the Name of Online Safety

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The internet cannot be treated as an adult-only space simply because it exposes children to harmful content. The Supreme Court has ruled that children, regardless of their age, enjoy a fundamental right to access and use the internet, and that protecting them from online dangers cannot become a justification for denying them that freedom altogether. A Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran delivered the ruling in Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors., while issuing a series of directions to strengthen the detection and removal of child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSEAM) from digital platforms. The Court held that internet access is protected under Article 21, read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which safeguards life and personal liberty as well as freedom of speech and expression. In its October 15 order, the Bench made clear that these constitutional protections extend to children just as they do to adults. “The safety of our children and their freedom are not at odds with each other. Our children are entitled to both,” the Court observed. The judges rejected the idea that children should lose access to an essential part of modern life because online platforms have failed to adequately tackle abusive or exploitative material.

Protect children, not punish them for platforms' failures

The Court drew a clear distinction between children who use the internet and those who exploit it. Responsibility for online abuse, it said, rests with individuals who create, distribute, sell or seek out prohibited material, as well as intermediaries that fail to detect and remove it. Restricting children's internet access because of these failures would place the burden on the very people the law seeks to protect. “To keep the child away from the internet on account of such failures would be to mistake the victim for the problem,” the Bench said. The ruling, however, does not prevent reasonable safeguards. The Court indicated that parental supervision, child-specific modes for social media accounts and restrictions on content inherently harmful to minors can form part of a proportionate approach to online safety. The emphasis, therefore, is on making digital spaces safer rather than excluding children from them.

Court flags continuing failures to remove abusive material

The judgment came on a petition filed by the Just Rights for Children Alliance, which raised concerns about continuing shortcomings in the efforts of online intermediaries to tackle CSEAM despite the Supreme Court's September 2024 judgment. The Bench expressed dissatisfaction with the progress made, observing that there appeared to have been “no progress worth the name” even after a substantial period had passed. It also referred to reports alleging that paid promotions were being used to direct users towards such material through redirect links and websites. In response, the Court issued a set of directions aimed at strengthening detection systems, accountability mechanisms and safeguards for children online.

Centre asked to establish stronger detection mechanisms

The Central government has been directed to file an affidavit detailing the technological measures online intermediaries have adopted to identify and remove CSEAM. The Centre must also frame guidelines for significant social media intermediaries on using hash-matching technology and URL lists to locate and take down prohibited material. The directions seek to make the process more systematic, reducing the possibility of abusive content continuing to circulate after it has been identified.

National database to help remove verified material

The Court ordered the creation of a National Hash & URL List Database dedicated exclusively to detecting and removing CSEAM. Material must pass through multiple stages of verification before being added to the database. The final assessment must be carried out independently by at least three trained human analysts. Once material is confirmed as CSEAM, its hash identifier and/or URL must be entered into the database. Online intermediaries will then be required to immediately disable and remove content matching an existing entry, without waiting to repeat the verification process themselves. The mechanism is intended to help platforms respond more quickly when previously identified material reappears online.

Easier complaints and greater platform accountability

The Bench also directed improvements to reporting and grievance redressal systems for complaints involving CSEAM. Platforms must prominently display the contact details of their grievance officers and ensure that users can access reporting facilities within two steps. Trained grievance officers must make the final decisions on complaints, although automated systems may be used for preliminary screening. The Court further asked the Centre to consider imposing exemplary fines on intermediaries that fail to meet their obligations. The proposed penalties should account for the seriousness and recurrence of violations, as well as the size and turnover of the platform concerned. Revenue earned from CSEAM or other prohibited material through paywalls and subscription-based services should also be forfeited and disgorged. The Bench called for closer scrutiny of subscription content and safeguards to prevent children from accessing harmful sexual material.

Digital safety and sex education to become part of school learning

Beyond platform-level enforcement, the Court stressed the importance of equipping children with the knowledge to recognise and report abuse. It directed that digital safety and age-appropriate sex education be incorporated into the core school curriculum, with NCERT and State Councils of Educational Research and Training (SCERTs) tasked with developing the material in consultation with experts. The curriculum should address consent, safe and unsafe touch, online exploitation and the ways children can report abuse without fear of being reprimanded. The directions also include training for teachers, regular awareness programmes for parents, and free counselling and psychological support for victims for as long as they need it. The Centre has been asked to take the necessary steps to implement the directions and submit a progress affidavit before the next hearing on December 10. The order places two responsibilities side by side: preserving children's freedom to participate in the digital world and ensuring that platforms, institutions and authorities do their part to protect them from exploitation.

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Supreme Court Strikes Down Tamil Nadu’s Gift of Temple Land, Orders Higher Rent

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Tamil Nadu government cannot acquire ownership of temple property through a gift deed, even when the land is intended for a public project, the Supreme Court has ruled, underscoring the legal limits on the State’s authority over religious institutions. The ruling came in a dispute over land belonging to the Nagapalayam Mariamman-Ponnachiamman Temple in Erode district. A Bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Alok Aradhe declared the transfer of the temple’s land to the State government for constructing a Taluk Office illegal. The Court made it clear that the government’s responsibility to protect religious and charitable properties does not give it the power to appropriate them. Public interest and administrative convenience cannot override statutory safeguards governing such assets. “The State, as custodian, cannot unilaterally usurp” property belonging to religious or charitable institutions, the Bench observed, warning that transactions violating this principle can be struck down regardless of how they are presented.

Gift deed held invalid under Tamil Nadu law

The case concerned 1 acre and 10 cents of temple land in Kodumudi village. In August 2017, a temporary trustee executed a gift deed transferring the property to the Tamil Nadu government for the construction of a Taluk Office. The transaction was challenged before the Madras High Court, which dismissed the petition in March 2019. The High Court had reasoned that the applicable statutory provision did not expressly prohibit the gifting of temple property. Devotees subsequently moved the Supreme Court, which took a different view after examining the nature of the land and the relevant legal provisions. The Bench found that the property was an inam grant intended to support and maintain the deity. Such land falls under the restrictions imposed by Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which prohibits its transfer through a gift. Consequently, the Court held that the deed was void from the outset. Even formal approval from the government could not make an otherwise prohibited transfer legally valid. The Bench observed that a gift of land dedicated to a deity was “void ab initio” and could not be revived through official sanction.

Trustee’s authority does not extend to unrestricted transfers

The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that a temporary trustee could transfer temple property without meaningful restrictions. Trustees are responsible for managing religious assets prudently and in the interests of the institution they serve. Since a gift involves transferring property without receiving consideration, it cannot ordinarily be treated as a prudent act of managing someone else’s assets, the Court said. The ruling reinforces the distinction between administering temple property and acquiring ownership of it. Those entrusted with managing religious institutions cannot treat their assets as freely disposable, particularly when legislation expressly restricts their transfer.

Government criticised for treating temple land as its own

The Bench expressed concern over the conduct of different government departments during the dispute. Although the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department had acknowledged that the land belonged to the temple, the Revenue Department reclassified it as government property and proceeded with construction. The State continued to defend the transaction until the Supreme Court sought clarification in February 2022. The Bench said the government should have recognised and discharged its statutory responsibilities without requiring prolonged judicial intervention. However, the Court also considered the practical consequences of its ruling. By that stage, the Taluk Office had already been constructed using public funds. Rather than ordering the government to vacate the premises, the Bench allowed it to continue occupying the land under a lease arrangement, while ensuring that the temple received substantially higher rent.

Rent raised, arrears ordered to be cleared

The Supreme Court increased the monthly rent payable for the land from ₹13,235 to ₹31,000, with the revised amount applicable retrospectively from March 8, 2019. The rent must be revised every three years, and the lease conditions must be framed with the temple’s interests as the primary consideration. The State government was also directed to clear all outstanding rent within three months. Additionally, the Court imposed costs of ₹1 lakh, payable to the temple within eight weeks. The directions seek to balance the continued use of an already constructed public building with the legal rights of the religious institution that owns the land. The judgment sends a clear message to State authorities: government ownership cannot be established through an unlawful gift of temple property, and public projects must comply with the statutory protections governing religious assets.

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Delhi High Court Says Women Can Face Gang-Rape Charges

Delhi High Court · Editorial Team

The Delhi High Court on 15 October upheld gang-rape charges against a woman and her co-accused. It held that Section 376D of the Penal Code and Section 70 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita use the gender-neutral word “persons” and extend liability to anyone acting with the group’s common intention, even without personally committing rape. The Court clarified that a woman alone cannot presently face that charge and expressed no view on whether a woman can commit rape.

Judge / Bench — Justice A. J. Bhambhani.

Advocates appearing — For the petitioners — Tanya Agarwal with Ritu, Akshay Singhal and Vishal M. Amicus curiae — Rohan J. Alva with Anant Sanghi. For the State — Digam Singh Dagar, APP.

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Kerala High Court Separates Temporary Fireworks Shops From Permanent Rules

Kerala High Court · Editorial Team

The Kerala High Court on 6 October held that amendments to Rules 83 and 86 of the Explosives Rules govern permanent fireworks shops, not applications for temporary festive-season outlets. It directed the District Collector to decide the petitioner’s application within three weeks without imposing the permanent-shop requirements, while insisting on strict scrutiny under Rule 84, which specifically regulates temporary licences.

Judge / Bench — Justice G. Girish.

Advocates appearing — For the petitioner — Biju Balakrishnan, V. S. Rakhee, Akshaya S. Nair, Jayakumar C. and Sandra Sunny Otta. For the respondents — O. M. Shalina, Deputy Solicitor General of India, and Sreehari Indu Kaladharan, Government Pleader.

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Madhya Pradesh High Court Recognises Electricity as Part of Right to Life

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Editorial Team

The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior on 24 September directed an electricity connection within seven days for a woman occupying part of a disputed family property. Section 43 of the Electricity Act protects an “occupier”, and the distribution company need not decide title or partition disputes. The Court held that electricity is an essential utility within Article 21 while the petitioner remains in possession, subject to her completing the applicable formalities.

Judge / Bench — Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke.

Advocates appearing — For the petitioner — Arshad Ali M. Haque. For the State — Shiraz Qureshi, Government Advocate. For respondents 2 and 3 — Prateek Kulshrestha. For respondent 5 — Himanshi Pathak.

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Delhi High Court Rejects Trademark Theory Against Social Media Criticism

Delhi High Court · Editorial Team

The Delhi High Court on 21 September held that a social-media influencer’s use of Niva Bupa’s mark merely to identify the company while discussing consumer and regulatory matters was not use “in the course of trade” under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act. The Court permitted withdrawal with liberty to file an ordinary civil suit, but imposed a notional ₹1 cost for misusing its specialised IP jurisdiction.

Judge / Bench — Justice A. J. Bhambhani.

Advocates appearing — For the plaintiffs — Ankur Khandelwal, Ankita Panikkar, Yash Jain, Prashant Shivam and Himanshu Sharma. For defendant 1 — Suhail Sehgal and Lakshay Singh. For defendant 3 — Varun Pathak, Sana Banyal and Komal Pathak. For defendant 4 — Ekta Sharma, Udit Tewari and Surabhi Katare.

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Madras High Court Orders CCTV Surveillance Across Tamil Nadu’s TASMAC Liquor Outlets

Madras High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Madras High Court has directed the Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation (TASMAC) to install CCTV cameras at every liquor outlet across the State, with footage to be monitored from regional offices to strengthen administrative oversight. The direction was issued by Justice B Pugalendhi of the Madurai Bench while disposing of five petitions filed by TASMAC employees challenging their transfer orders in Sachidanandam v. Managing Director. The Court also welcomed TASMAC’s proposal to introduce a transparent counselling mechanism for employee transfers, observing that the initiative could help resolve several administrative issues within the corporation. “The respondents shall ensure proper administration in the TASMAC shops by installing CCTV cameras in all the shops and the same shall also be monitored from the Regional Offices,” the Court directed.

Transfer dispute exposes administrative concerns

The case arose after five TASMAC employees, including salesmen and a supervisor working at an outlet in Thiruvaiyaru, Thanjavur district, challenged transfer orders issued on January 9, 2025. The employees alleged that their transfers were prompted by another employee, Govindaraj. They claimed that one of the petitioners, Kodeeswaran, had lodged a complaint against him before the TASMAC District Manager in Thanjavur on August 28, 2024, and that the subsequent transfers were connected to that complaint. On February 5, 2025, the High Court stayed the transfers on an interim basis and directed TASMAC to allow the employees to continue working at their original outlet. TASMAC subsequently disputed receiving the complaint. The district manager maintained that there was no material establishing its receipt, while the employees produced a copy bearing the seal of the district manager’s office. Taking note of the conflicting claims, the Court directed the TASMAC Managing Director on September 3 to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.

Court backs transparent transfer policy

During the subsequent hearing, the Managing Director submitted a report stating that TASMAC intended to introduce a transparent transfer counselling process for its employees. The Court welcomed the proposal, noting that a more transparent mechanism could help address administrative difficulties within the corporation. “This would certainly resolve many problems in the TASMAC,” the Court observed while disposing of the petitions. With the directions on CCTV surveillance and the proposed transfer policy, the Court emphasised the need for better oversight of TASMAC outlets and greater transparency in the corporation’s administrative functioning.

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Allahabad High Court: Section 69 BNS Does Not Cover Transgender Women in False Marriage Promise Cases

Allahabad High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Allahabad High Court has ruled that Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which criminalises sexual relationships established through deceitful means, including a false promise of marriage, does not extend to transgender women under its interpretation of the provision. Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal made the observation while granting bail to a man accused of entering into a relationship with a transgender woman after allegedly promising to marry her. The Court held that the term “woman” under Section 69 BNS refers to a female human being and does not include a transgender woman, even where the person has undergone sex reassignment surgery. “The word ‘woman’ mentioned in Section 69 of BNS includes only female human being,” the Court observed.

Separate legal protection under transgender rights law

In its order, the Court referred to the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, which recognises transgender persons as a distinct category under the law. It explained that a person who undergoes sex reassignment surgery does not cease to be transgender for the purposes of the statutory definition, regardless of the sex assigned at birth or the gender affirmed through surgery. However, the Court clarified that this interpretation does not leave transgender persons without legal recourse in cases of sexual abuse. Section 18(d) of the 2019 Act specifically provides punishment for acts involving physical or sexual abuse of transgender persons, with imprisonment of up to two years, the Court noted. The order also referred to a 2023 report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, which had recommended amendments to the BNS to bring transgender women within the scope of rape provisions. The Court observed that the recommendation had not been accepted by Parliament.

Relationship, alleged financial loss and refusal to marry

The case arose from a complaint registered by Bareilly police under Section 69 BNS. The complainant alleged that she had been in a relationship with the accused for more than one-and-a-half years after he promised to marry her. According to the complaint, the accused subsequently refused to marry her after allegedly taking more than ₹5 lakh from her. She also alleged that members of his family had scolded her. While seeking bail, the accused challenged the applicability of Section 69, arguing that the complainant had been assigned male at birth and had undergone vulval reconstruction surgery in April 2023. The defence also relied on a medical board's findings regarding her physical characteristics, including the absence of a uterus, to contend that the statutory provision could not be invoked. The Court noted that the complainant had acknowledged being assigned male at birth and later undergoing sex reassignment surgery. It further observed that she had not formally applied for a change in her gender. On this basis, the Court concluded that a prima facie case under Section 69 BNS was not made out and held that the accused was entitled to bail. The ruling was delivered in Mohd Saakir @ Mohd Sakir v. State of Uttar Pradesh. Advocate Mayuri Mehrotra assisted the Court as amicus curiae. Advocate Krishna Gopal represented the accused, while Additional Government Advocate Ram Kumar Verma appeared for the State.

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Wife’s Death, Confusion Over Election Duty: High Court Quashes Haryana Teacher’s Suspension

Punjab and Haryana High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has come to the aid of a Haryana teacher suspended for failing to attend Special Intensive Revision (SIR) election training after seeking relief from booth-level officer (BLO) duties following his wife’s death. In a strongly worded order, Justice Harpreet Singh Brar quashed the suspension of Sunil Kumar and the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The Court also imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the District Elementary Education Officer, Hisar, and the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) of the Barwala Assembly constituency. The Court found serious inconsistencies in the authorities’ handling of Kumar’s request to be relieved of election duties, particularly when three other teachers had subsequently been appointed to replace him. “A teacher who had lost his wife and was left to care for his aged mother and children sought release from additional election duty through the proper channel,” the Court observed, criticising officials for holding Kumar responsible for failures involving his replacements.

Suspension despite request for relief

Kumar had served as a BLO for 11 years without any adverse remarks. However, his circumstances changed dramatically after his wife died in September 2025, leaving him responsible for caring for his 83-year-old mother and children. He subsequently requested that he be relieved of his additional election responsibilities. His application received favourable recommendations from the head of his institution and the Block Education Officer, Barwala. Three teachers were later appointed in his place for the same polling booth. Yet, according to Kumar, no formal order rejecting his request or directing him to continue as BLO was ever communicated to him. Despite this, the District Elementary Education Officer suspended him on July 7, acting on a recommendation from the constituency’s electoral registration officer. The allegations included improper performance of BLO duties and absence from SIR training. Kumar challenged both the suspension and the proposed disciplinary proceedings, arguing that he had been penalised despite having sought relief through the prescribed channel.

Officials blamed him for substitutes’ failures

The High Court found that the failure of the replacement teachers to report for duty or provide the required mobile and EPIC numbers for updating the official portal could not be attributed to Kumar. The Court pointed out that the election machinery had appointed substitutes but failed to ensure that they actually joined and that the necessary records were updated. It also questioned the allegation that Kumar had skipped SIR training, noting that the authorities themselves could not consistently establish the relevant training date. The Court further observed that none of the three substitute BLOs had attended the training conducted on February 8, 2026, yet there was no material showing that action had been taken against any of them. Such unequal treatment, coupled with the authorities’ inability to clearly establish the training details, demonstrated a failure to apply their minds to the matter, the Court said. It concluded that Kumar had been caught in a dispute arising largely from poor coordination within the election administration. While replacement appointments had been made, officials had neither ensured the substitutes’ joining nor formally informed Kumar whether he had been relieved of his responsibilities.

Salary arrears must be cleared within four weeks

The Court also took note of the financial consequences of the suspension, observing that Kumar had remained without salary since June 2. It directed the authorities to clear all his outstanding dues within four weeks and ordered that his personal circumstances be considered before assigning him any BLO duties in the future. In addition, the Chief Electoral Officer, Haryana, was directed to ensure that whenever a BLO is replaced, a written order clearly stating whether the outgoing officer has been relieved is communicated to that person. The Court also instructed the concerned electoral registration officers to ensure that replacement BLOs formally join and complete the required portal mapping within a reasonable period. The ruling in Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others underscores the need for election authorities to maintain clear records and communicate duty changes properly, rather than penalising an employee for administrative failures beyond his control.

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Delhi High Court Closes Review Bid by Suspended Chandigarh DRT Presiding Officer

Delhi High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Delhi High Court has refused to reconsider its decisions upholding the suspension of former Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, Presiding Officer MM Dhonchak, finding no apparent error in its earlier rulings. A Division Bench comprising Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Tejas Karia dismissed Dhonchak’s review petition on October 16, holding that his plea sought to reopen findings that had already been examined and decided. “The Review Petition merely seeks reconsideration of findings already rendered in the Judgment, which is impermissible,” the Bench observed, adding that Dhonchak had failed to establish any apparent error or other valid ground for review. The case concerns Dhonchak’s suspension, which was ordered on February 13, 2024, while allegations of misconduct against him were being examined. The suspension was subsequently extended pending the outcome of the inquiry. Dhonchak retired from the district judiciary in 2021 after a career in which he earned a reputation as an activist judge. He took charge as Presiding Officer of DRT-II, Chandigarh, on February 20, 2022. His tenure at the tribunal was marked by a dispute with the DRT Bar Association, Chandigarh, which raised complaints alleging misconduct and objected to certain orders passed by him. The complaints were referred to the Chairperson of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Delhi, who exercises oversight over the tribunals. The dispute intensified when members of the Bar Association abstained from work and approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court, alleging that Dhonchak had passed adverse orders in cases before him. In October 2023, the High Court took note of the strained relationship between the tribunal's presiding officer and the Bar Association and restrained him from passing adverse orders in pending matters. Dhonchak subsequently approached the Supreme Court. The apex court left the matter to be dealt with by the DRAT Chairperson. Meanwhile, a preliminary report dated July 10, 2023, led to the constitution of a Search-cum-Selection Committee. The committee recommended a formal inquiry by former Jharkhand High Court Chief Justice Virender Singh. Acting on the committee's recommendation, the authorities suspended Dhonchak on February 13, 2024. The suspension was extended for 180 days in May 2024 and again in November that year, following reviews by the Suspension Review Committee. Dhonchak challenged the suspension before the Delhi High Court, but his writ petition was dismissed in September 2025. His subsequent appeal was also rejected in August 2026, prompting him to seek a review of the decisions. In the latest proceedings, the Bench found no basis to reopen the matter. It rejected the contention that his pleadings and written submissions had been overlooked, noting that the judgment did not suffer from such an omission. The Court also dismissed the grievance concerning enhanced subsistence allowance, pointing out that Dhonchak had not sought that relief in the earlier proceedings. With no review-worthy error established, the Court declined to disturb its previous decisions upholding the suspension. Dhonchak was represented by Balraj Singh. The Union government was represented by Central Government Standing Counsel Pratima Lakra and Shailendra Kumar Mishra.

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Gujarat High Court Protects Reliance’s Jamnagar Land Deal, Rejects Claim Filed 33 Years After Cancellation

Gujarat High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Gujarat High Court has refused to reopen a decades-old land dispute involving Reliance Industries Limited’s petroleum and petrochemicals Special Economic Zone in Jamnagar, ruling that a claim for restoration could not survive an unexplained delay of 33 years. Justice Devan M Desai set aside an October 2008 order directing the State government to reconsider the restoration claim. The Court restored the effect of the Jamnagar Collector’s May 2006 decision rejecting the claim on grounds of delay. The dispute centres on approximately nine acres of land in Navagam village, Jamnagar, originally allotted to Deva Sajan Rabari in June 1962 for agricultural purposes. The government cancelled the allotment in December 1972 after finding that Rabari had neither taken possession of the land nor cultivated it within the prescribed two-year period. It was only in 2005 that his legal heirs approached the authorities seeking restoration of the property. The Collector rejected their request in May 2006, citing the lengthy delay. In the meantime, the Gujarat government had allotted the disputed land to Reliance Industries in April 2008 as part of a much larger land allocation covering around 10,000 acres for the development of its Jamnagar SEZ. Reliance paid the requisite consideration, took possession and began development activities. The dispute resurfaced when the State’s Special Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals), passed an order in October 2008 directing the authorities to reconsider the heirs’ claim. Reliance’s request to participate in those proceedings was also rejected, prompting the company to approach the High Court. Reliance argued that allowing a restoration claim after several decades would undermine rights lawfully created in its favour through the subsequent allotment. The legal heirs, on the other hand, maintained that the original cancellation had taken place without giving their predecessor an opportunity to be heard. They also argued that Reliance’s allotment was affected by the pending dispute. The High Court found little merit in these objections. It noted that there was no evidence to establish that Rabari had ever taken possession of the land or cultivated it. The original allottee had also failed to challenge the cancellation during his lifetime. The explanation that he remained unaware of the cancellation for nearly three decades did not satisfy the Court. The prolonged inaction, it held, could not be brushed aside when considering a request to restore the land. The Court further observed that the special secretary had failed to properly account for the 33-year delay and had relied on an unsupported assertion that the land continued to be cultivated. It also rejected the contention that the existence of litigation automatically undermined Reliance’s allotment. The Court took note of the fact that the civil suit filed by the legal heirs had been dismissed for default in 2010. Finding the 2008 order unsustainable, the High Court quashed it and upheld the Collector’s decision refusing restoration of the land. The ruling brings the long-running dispute to a close at this stage, leaving Reliance’s allotment undisturbed by the restoration claim.

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Gujarat High Court Prioritises Women’s Convenience in Matrimonial Case Transfers

Gujarat High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The practical difficulties faced by women pursuing matrimonial disputes must weigh heavily when courts decide whether a case should be moved to another jurisdiction, the Gujarat High Court has held, stressing that access to justice must extend beyond what the law guarantees on paper. In Purvaben vs Hirenbhai Chaganbhai Solanki, Justice D N Ray ruled that the convenience of the weaker party should be the primary consideration in deciding applications seeking the transfer of matrimonial proceedings. The Court observed that women must not be left struggling with financial and logistical barriers that make pursuing a legal remedy increasingly difficult. “The only test is to be applied is the convenience of the weaker party,” the Court said, adding that the central question is whether transferring a case would help address the inherent inequality faced by the person seeking justice. Any suppression of facts or misrepresentation by the applicant, however, must also receive due consideration.

Matrimonial litigation must not become a punishment

Highlighting the distinct nature of matrimonial disputes, the Court noted that the burden of litigation can sometimes become more distressing than the original grievance that prompted the parties to approach the judiciary. “Matrimonial disputes form a special category of disputes where both the parties suffer through the process of litigation sometimes even more than the malady they were seeking to redress by invoking legal remedies available to them,” it observed. The Court added that the legal process itself can sometimes become a form of punishment for those involved. The ruling came in response to a wife's application under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to transfer a family suit from the Family Court in Amreli to the Family Court in Junagadh, nearly 100 kilometres away. The woman told the Court that she had no independent source of income and struggled to meet the travel costs and legal expenses associated with attending proceedings in Amreli. Her husband opposed the transfer request.

Constitutional protection for equal access to justice

Referring to Article 15(3) of the Constitution, the High Court emphasised the need for affirmative measures that help women overcome structural disadvantages when accessing legal remedies. The Court explained that protective discrimination serves a broader purpose: enabling parties who begin from unequal positions to have a genuinely equal opportunity to seek justice. It stressed that, while considering a transfer application, the Court is not required to examine the competing allegations or determine the merits of the underlying matrimonial dispute. The focus at this stage is whether shifting the proceedings would help balance the practical disadvantages confronting the applicant. Finding merit in the wife's concerns, the High Court allowed her application and directed that the family suit be transferred from Amreli to Junagadh. The decision reinforces the principle that procedural convenience is not merely a technical consideration in matrimonial litigation. Where financial hardship and other practical obstacles threaten to undermine a woman's ability to pursue her case, courts must consider whether transferring the proceedings can make access to justice more meaningful.

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Delhi High Court Strikes Down Educomp Fraud Probe, Faults Government’s Reliance on Unverified Material

Delhi High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Delhi High Court has overturned the Centre’s decision to order a Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) probe into education technology company Educomp Solutions Limited, ruling that the decision was made without adequate application of mind. In its October 16 order, Justice Amit Mahajan criticised the manner in which the government relied on material to justify the investigation, describing the approach as cavalier. The Court held that the August 17, 2018 order authorising the probe could not stand because the decision lacked a properly supported basis. The ruling came in Vinod Kumar Dandona v. Union of India & Ors., a case challenging the investigation into alleged financial irregularities at the company. The allegations under scrutiny included manipulation of accounts, diversion of funds, fictitious transactions and the sale of group companies at undervalued prices. The investigation had been ordered under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, which empowers the Central government to refer a company’s affairs to the SFIO. Justice Mahajan stressed that officials responsible for corporate investigations are expected to exercise informed judgment, particularly when invoking powers with serious consequences. They cannot justify such action by relying on unsubstantiated material or reports that have not been independently verified.

Court questions the basis for launching the investigation

The petitions were filed by former independent director Vinod Kumar Dandona, founder Shantanu Prakash, director Jagdish Prakash, Learning Leadership Foundation and former chief financial officer Ashish Mittal. They challenged the government’s decision on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an SFIO investigation. According to their submissions, earlier inspections had not established fraud or the diversion of company funds. They also alleged that the probe had its roots in a corporate dispute involving former business partner Raffles Group. The Centre defended its decision, pointing to a review conducted by an oversight committee in June 2018. It said the decision had taken into account inspection reports, complaints from lenders, communications from the Prime Minister’s Office and media coverage. The Court, however, examined whether these materials provided a sufficiently sound foundation for ordering such an extensive investigation.

Media reports and complaints failed to establish sufficient grounds

A report published by The Wire was among the material cited in support of the investigation. Justice Mahajan held that a newspaper article, without independent corroboration, could not by itself justify handing a company’s affairs over to the SFIO. The Court also noted that inspection reports had not uncovered evidence of funds being siphoned off or misappropriated. A letter from a Member of Parliament, it added, was likewise insufficient to establish grounds for the investigation. The judgment underlined the distinction between allegations that warrant scrutiny and verified material capable of supporting the exercise of significant statutory powers.

Government order and subsequent proceedings quashed

Finding that the Centre had failed to demonstrate proper application of mind under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, the High Court set aside the August 17, 2018 order directing the SFIO investigation. All consequential proceedings arising from that order were also quashed, bringing the challenged investigation to an end. The decision reinforces the requirement that the government must have a substantiated basis before invoking the SFIO’s investigative powers. Serious allegations, the Court’s reasoning makes clear, cannot replace the need for a reasoned and evidence-backed decision.

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