The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006, ruling that victims of alleged human rights violations can directly approach a Human Rights Court without first seeking intervention from the Human Rights Commission.
The decision overturns a Karnataka High Court ruling that had declared the provision unconstitutional and quashed proceedings initiated against certain police officials.
A bench of the Supreme Court restored the proceedings after finding that Rule 6 neither conflicts with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 nor exceeds the State’s rule-making authority under Section 41 of the legislation.
Rule 6 lays down the procedure for complaints before Human Rights Courts. It allows a victim, a legal representative, a registered non-governmental organisation or a member of the public to initiate proceedings against a public servant accused of committing or abetting a human rights violation while acting in an official capacity.
Under the rule, the Human Rights Court may order an investigation by a police officer of at least the rank of Superintendent of Police. Alternatively, it may conduct an inquiry using the procedure applicable to private complaints under criminal procedure law.
The dispute arose from a complaint filed before the Sessions Judge and Special Judge functioning as a Human Rights Court in Vijayapura. The complainant alleged that his human rights had been violated by police personnel while he was in custody.
The Human Rights Court subsequently directed the Superintendent of Police to investigate the allegations, following which a case was registered against the officials concerned.
The officials challenged the proceedings before the Karnataka High Court, arguing that Rule 6 was incompatible with the framework of the 1993 Act and went beyond the powers available to the State legislature.
The High Court accepted those arguments, struck down the rule and brought the proceedings to an end.
The Supreme Court, however, took a different view of the statutory framework.
It explained that the Protection of Human Rights Act establishes two distinct mechanisms. Human Rights Commissions operate primarily as bodies that conduct inquiries and make recommendations, while Human Rights Courts exercise judicial authority in matters involving alleged violations.
According to the Court, the existence of the Commission’s inquiry mechanism does not mean that its recommendation must precede every prosecution relating to a human rights violation.
The judges noted that the law does not expressly require a complainant to first approach a Human Rights Commission before invoking the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court. Nor does Section 30, which provides for Human Rights Courts, make their authority conditional upon the completion of proceedings before a Commission.
Reading such a requirement into the law, the Court held, would effectively add a restriction that the legislature itself had not imposed.
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Rule 6 creates new substantive rights or offences. It found that the provision does not introduce a new offence, prescribe additional punishment or broaden the statutory definition of human rights.
Instead, the rule merely establishes a procedural route for bringing matters before a Human Rights Court already empowered under the 1993 Act.
With the High Court’s ruling set aside, the proceedings arising from the complaint against the police officials have been revived. The judgment also makes clear that access to Human Rights Courts cannot be blocked merely because a complainant has not first pursued remedies before a Human Rights Commission.
