The Supreme Court has clarified that the admissibility of a document relied upon by a plaintiff cannot be used as a ground to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) or (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
A bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar made the observation while allowing an appeal concerning an eviction dispute and setting aside an order of the Patna High Court.
The dispute arose from a lease of land granted by the appellants to the respondents for 33 years at a monthly rent of ₹92,550, subject to a 7% annual escalation.
According to the plaintiffs, the parties later entered into a supplementary lease deed after the defendants sought financing to construct a school on the property. The supplementary document altered certain terms of the original lease, including the rent payable in relation to the constructed area.
The plaintiffs maintained that the supplementary deed merely modified the existing registered lease and therefore did not independently require registration.
A dispute subsequently arose over payment of rent. The plaintiffs issued a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, terminating the tenancy before filing a suit seeking eviction and recovery of rent arrears.
The defendants, however, denied having executed the supplementary lease deed. They also sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d), arguing that the unregistered document was inadmissible under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908.
The trial court declined to reject the plaint, treating the supplementary document as part of the registered lease arrangement.
The Patna High Court took a different view in revision. Relying on earlier decisions, including M/s KB Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Development Consultant Ltd. and Sunil Kumar Roy v. M/s Bhowra Kankanee Collieries Ltd., it held that the unregistered supplementary deed could not be admitted in evidence and therefore could not be treated as part of the registered lease.
The matter then reached the Supreme Court.
The plaintiffs argued that the High Court had gone beyond the limited scope of an Order VII Rule 11 inquiry by examining whether the supplementary deed was admissible. According to them, that issue could only be properly determined during the trial.
The defendants countered that the suit itself rested on an inadmissible document and consequently disclosed no sustainable cause of action.
The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs on the procedural issue.
Referring to its earlier ruling in PV Guru Raj Reddy v. P Neeradha Reddy, the Court reiterated that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is an exceptional power because it brings the plaintiff’s case to an end without a trial.
At that preliminary stage, the court is required to examine the averments contained in the plaint to determine whether a cause of action has been disclosed or whether the suit is barred by law. The defence raised by the defendant is not ordinarily relevant to that examination.
The Court made it clear that the admissibility of a document filed with the plaint falls into a different category.
Whether the document can ultimately be admitted in evidence is an issue that must be examined during the trial. It cannot, by itself, be converted into a ground for rejecting the plaint at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(a) or (d).
The ruling therefore draws a clear procedural line: the Order VII Rule 11 stage is not the forum for deciding the evidentiary admissibility of documents relied upon by a plaintiff. Such objections can be examined when the suit proceeds to trial.
