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3 Nov 2026 — The Lawyers' Post — Daily Edition
Saved newspaper edition with 12 court reports.
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- Supreme Court Upholds Convictions In Wife’s Strangulation Case
- Supreme Court Allows 423-Day Delay In Challenge To Ex-Parte Decree, Modifies ₹75 Lakh Deposit Condition
- Supreme Court Sets Seven-Day Deadline for Financial Aid to Rescued Bonded Labourers
- Supreme Court Draws the Line: Delay in Hearing Appeals Cannot Justify Release of Convicts in Heinous Crimes
- Government Company Employees Cannot Claim Section 197 CrPC Protection Solely As Public Servants: Supreme Court
- Punjab And Haryana High Court Orders Fresh Premature-Release Decision
- Meghalaya High Court Upholds Interim Suspension, Orders POSH Safeguards
- Bombay High Court Rejects GST Predeposit On Disputed Interest Alone
- MP High Court Revives Woman’s Right to Contest Suit, Flags Lawyer’s Misconduct Over Misleading WhatsApp Updates
- Allahabad High Court: CCTV Surveillance Cannot Come at the Cost of a Neighbour’s Privacy
- LinkedIn Account Blocking: Delhi High Court Says Civil Suit, Not Writ Petition, Is the Proper Remedy
- Madhya Pradesh High Court Protects Journalist, Quashes FIR Over Ganesh Visarjan Violence Report
Supreme Court Upholds Convictions In Wife’s Strangulation Case
Supreme Court · Editorial Team
The Supreme Court on 2 November 2026 upheld Ramkishan Digambar Jadhav’s murder conviction and the surviving appellants’ dowry-death and cruelty convictions, directing surrender within four weeks.
Judge / Bench — Sandeep Mehta and Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, JJ.; judgment by Sandeep Mehta, J.
In Criminal Appeals 1849/2013 and 962/2014 (2026 INSC 1187), medical evidence established throttling. The Court rejected the husband’s accidental-death explanation, treating his failure to explain events within his special knowledge as an additional link in the circumstantial case. Digambar’s appeal had abated following his death.
Advocates appearing — Appellants and respondent State of Maharashtra: Not named in the judgment.
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Supreme Court Allows 423-Day Delay In Challenge To Ex-Parte Decree, Modifies ₹75 Lakh Deposit Condition
Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Supreme Court has upheld a Madras High Court Division Bench decision condoning a delay of 423 days in filing an application to set aside an ex-parte decree, ruling that the defendant should be given an opportunity to contest the case on merits. However, the Court modified the condition attached to the relief. Instead of paying ₹75 lakh directly to the plaintiff, the amount must remain deposited with the High Court and be subject to the final outcome of the proceedings. A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S Chandurkar passed the order while disposing of cross-appeals challenging both the condonation of delay and the monetary condition imposed by the Madras High Court.
Dispute Over A ₹21.88 Crore Recovery Claim
The dispute arose from several hire-purchase agreements and a lease agreement allegedly entered into between Integrated Finance Company Limited and partnership firm Business India, represented by three individuals. In March 2010, the finance company filed a recovery suit seeking ₹21,88,11,451.96, along with future interest at 36% per annum. The defendants failed to appear despite service of notice. In August 2021, the Madras High Court's Single Judge placed the firm and two of its representatives ex-parte. One of the defendants had died in the meantime. The suit was subsequently decreed in November 2021. Defendant No. 4 later sought condonation of the delay in filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which allows a defendant to seek the setting aside of an ex-parte decree. The Single Judge rejected his application in March 2023, observing that he had appeared through counsel and filed a common affidavit with the other defendants. The Court concluded that he was aware of the proceedings before the decree was passed.
Madras High Court Reopens The Door To A Contest
Challenging the rejection, Defendant No. 4 approached the Division Bench, arguing that he genuinely believed Defendant No. 2 was handling the case and that efforts were underway to settle the financial claim. In August 2024, the Division Bench found that although the defendant had not acted with the required diligence, his bona fides in approaching the Court belatedly could not be doubted. The Bench also took note of the fact that the entire claim had been decreed ex-parte, carrying interest at a steep rate of 36% annually. It accordingly set aside the Single Judge's order and condoned the 423-day delay. The relief, however, came with a condition: Defendant No. 4 was required to pay ₹75 lakh to the plaintiff within four weeks, enabling the amount to be distributed among depositors. He was also permitted to file his written statement within four weeks, with the suit directed to be decided expeditiously. The decision triggered cross-appeals before the Supreme Court.
Defendant Seeks Unconditional Relief
Appearing for Defendant No. 4, Senior Advocate Siddharth Bhatnagar argued that once the Court had found merit in granting the defendant an opportunity to contest the suit, the delay should have been condoned without imposing a financial condition. He also objected to the direction requiring payment of ₹75 lakh directly to the plaintiff for distribution among depositors, pointing out that the underlying claim remained seriously disputed and had not yet been examined on merits. The finance company, on the other hand, argued that the Division Bench had wrongly condoned the delay. It contended that the defendant had introduced additional grounds at the appellate stage that were not raised before the Single Judge. The plaintiff further maintained that the ₹75 lakh condition had been imposed on the basis of a submission made on behalf of the defendant himself. It also argued that the amount was inadequate considering the scale of the decree.
Supreme Court Modifies Deposit Arrangement
The Supreme Court referred to its earlier order passed in September 2024, where it had identified the principal concern with the Madras High Court's direction. The Court had observed that the amount should not have been paid directly to the plaintiff. Instead, it ought to have been deposited with the High Court Registry and invested pending the proceedings. The execution of the ex-parte decree was stayed subject to Defendant No. 4 depositing ₹75 lakh with the High Court. The amount was to be kept in an interest-bearing fixed deposit. The Supreme Court noted that the deposit had since been made, though with some delay.
No Reason To Interfere With Condonation Of Delay
On the question of whether the 423-day delay should have been condoned, the Bench examined the grounds raised before the Single Judge as well as the additional submissions made before the Division Bench. It held that the discretion exercised by the Division Bench could not be described as arbitrary or irrational so as to warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court emphasised that Defendant No. 4 had already been granted an opportunity to contest the proceedings on merits. The Supreme Court accordingly upheld the condonation of delay while modifying the direction concerning the ₹75 lakh deposit. The amount will remain secured with the High Court, with its ultimate treatment dependent on the final outcome of the proceedings.
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Supreme Court Sets Seven-Day Deadline for Financial Aid to Rescued Bonded Labourers
Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Supreme Court has made it clear that rescuing a person from bonded labour is only the beginning of the State's responsibility. Financial assistance promised under the rehabilitation scheme must ordinarily reach rescued workers within seven days of the issuance of their release certificates, the Court has ruled. Emphasising the urgency of rehabilitation, the Court observed that delayed financial support defeats the very purpose of the scheme. People freed from bonded labour often have no independent means of earning a livelihood and remain exposed to the risk of further exploitation. “Financial assistance intended to address immediate needs loses much of its purpose when its disbursement is delayed for months or years,” the Court observed, stressing that constitutional responsibilities towards bonded labourers do not end with their release. A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh issued a series of directions to strengthen the implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, and the Central Sector Scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labourers. The Union Government has been directed to ensure consistent implementation of the revised Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), issued on May 14, 2026, across the country. All States and Union Territories have been given six months to comply with the directions. The Centre must also prepare supplementary guidelines in consultation with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) within three months.
Nearly three-year wait for rehabilitation assistance
The ruling came in two writ petitions concerning the identification, rescue, release and rehabilitation of bonded labourers. One of the cases arose after Surendra Manjhi and several other workers were rescued from a brick kiln in Uttar Pradesh's Shahjahanpur district on February 28, 2019. The workers, who belonged to Bihar, had allegedly been brought to Uttar Pradesh on the promise that they would work to repay bonded debts. Instead, they were subjected to exploitative working conditions. Although they were rescued, repatriated to Bihar and issued release certificates, the promised financial assistance did not reach everyone promptly. Manjhi received his rehabilitation assistance only in 2022, almost three years after his rescue. The petitioners told the Court that 42 workers had been issued release certificates, but only 25 had received the immediate financial assistance of Rs 20,000 each. The remaining 17 were still waiting for payment. The Supreme Court directed Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to jointly verify the status of assistance payable to these 17 workers within one month. Any outstanding amount found payable must be released as quickly as possible, preferably within three months and no later than six months.
Complaints must be verified within 24 hours
To prevent delays at the initial stage itself, the Court prescribed strict timelines for handling bonded labour complaints. Complaints should ordinarily be verified within 24 hours, with rescue operations undertaken promptly wherever necessary. Once bonded labour is identified, the competent authority must conduct the required inquiry without delay. A release certificate should ordinarily be issued within 24 hours of the determination that a person is engaged in bonded labour. The Centre has also been asked to introduce a uniform format for release certificates, which must be recognised by every State and Union Territory. The Court said administrative differences between States should not create obstacles for rescued workers seeking rehabilitation benefits. It further stressed that statements of rescued labourers must be recorded with appropriate safeguards. Release certificates and details of rehabilitation entitlements should be provided in languages they can understand. Special care and sensitivity must be exercised in cases involving children.
States cannot use administrative hurdles to deny benefits
The Court highlighted the difficulties faced by workers rescued outside their home States. Poor coordination between authorities often leads to delays in issuing release certificates, transferring records and processing rehabilitation assistance. Such administrative complications cannot become a reason to withhold benefits from rescued labourers. The Court made it clear that a worker's entitlement to rehabilitation cannot depend on differences in State procedures or jurisdictional arrangements. The State where the rescue takes place must ensure that the necessary steps are taken to secure the worker's rehabilitation, rather than allowing coordination gaps to leave vulnerable individuals without support. The judgment reinforces a crucial principle: freedom from bonded labour must be accompanied by meaningful rehabilitation. Without timely financial assistance and effective administrative support, rescued workers risk falling back into the very conditions from which they were freed.
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Supreme Court Draws the Line: Delay in Hearing Appeals Cannot Justify Release of Convicts in Heinous Crimes
Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees
The prolonged pendency of criminal appeals cannot, by itself, become a reason to suspend the sentence of a convict involved in a heinous offence, the Supreme Court has ruled, cautioning courts against granting relief without a careful assessment of the evidence and the period of incarceration already undergone. A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran set aside a Rajasthan High Court order suspending the sentence of a murder convict, observing that the possibility of an appeal not being heard in the near future cannot be the sole basis for releasing a person convicted of a grave crime. The Court strongly criticised the practice of granting such relief merely because appeals remain pending, pointing out that doing so without examining the strength of the evidence and the actual period spent in prison exposes serious weaknesses in the criminal justice system. “Whatever be the reason for the pendency of cases,” the Court observed, courts cannot remain complacent by releasing convicts of heinous offences, particularly when they have served only a negligible portion of their sentences. Such decisions, it said, could put the safety of society at risk.
Murder Conviction Linked To Sarpanch Election Rivalry
The matter reached the Supreme Court after the father of the deceased challenged the Rajasthan High Court's decision to suspend the sentence of the principal accused, A1, who was described as the mastermind behind the crime. The murder was allegedly committed out of rivalry connected with a local Sarpanch election. The High Court had granted suspension of sentence to the accused, including A1, primarily on the ground that numerous criminal appeals were pending and that the appeal was unlikely to be taken up for hearing in the near future. The Supreme Court found this reasoning inadequate. Allowing the appeal, the Bench held that the High Court had failed to give proper consideration to the evidence that had led to A1's conviction. The Court also stressed that while individual liberty remains an important consideration, courts must not overlook the concerns of the victim's family, particularly after a person has been convicted by a competent court. At the post-conviction stage, the presumption of innocence no longer operates in the same manner as it does during trial, the Bench noted.
Courts Must Examine Evidence Before Suspending Sentences
The Supreme Court acknowledged that delays in the disposal of criminal appeals are a persistent reality. Such delays may become relevant when a convict has already undergone a substantial period of incarceration. However, the Court clarified that the mere pendency of an appeal cannot automatically justify suspension of sentence, especially in cases involving serious offences where the convict has spent only a limited period in prison. It emphasised that applications for suspension of sentence must be decided with caution and on the basis of a prima facie assessment of the evidence. Where the evidence appears compelling, courts must carefully weigh the gravity of the offence, the period of incarceration already undergone and the possibility of prolonged appellate proceedings. The Bench cautioned against adopting a mechanical approach, observing that the burden created by delayed appeals is often borne more heavily by citizens than by the courts themselves.
Four Months In Jail Not Enough To Warrant Relief
In the case before it, the Supreme Court noted that A1 had undergone only around four months of incarceration. Considering the seriousness of the offence, the evidence supporting the conviction and the limited period spent in prison, the Bench held that the High Court's decision to suspend the sentence could not be sustained. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the suspension order and withdrew the relief granted to A1. The Bench, however, clarified that its observations concerning A1's guilt and the evidence against the other accused were only prima facie in nature. They would not influence the independent consideration of the pending criminal appeal. The ruling reinforces a clear principle: the delay in hearing an appeal cannot become a shortcut to release a convict in a heinous crime. Courts must balance the realities of judicial delays with the gravity of the offence, the evidence on record and the interests of the victim's family.
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Government Company Employees Cannot Claim Section 197 CrPC Protection Solely As Public Servants: Supreme Court
Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Supreme Court has clarified that employees of government companies and public sector undertakings do not automatically enjoy protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) from prosecution without prior sanction. A bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar held that being designated as a public servant is not sufficient to claim immunity from criminal proceedings. Employees of government instrumentalities must independently satisfy the legal requirements for protection under the provision. The ruling came while setting aside a Rajasthan High Court order that had discharged three employees of Jodhpur Discom from charges under the Electricity Act, 2003, on the ground that prior sanction for prosecution had not been obtained. Electricity theft allegations The case concerned allegations that three Jodhpur Discom officials had facilitated electricity theft by Balim Steel Pvt. Ltd. through manipulation of electricity meters. According to the prosecution, the alleged electricity theft enabled the company to derive benefits worth approximately ₹12.99 crore, of which ₹8.15 crore remained unpaid. Following the investigation, a chargesheet was filed and charges were framed against the accused officials. However, the employees approached the Rajasthan High Court, challenging the cognizance taken against them. The High Court accepted their plea, holding that prosecution could not proceed without prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC. Jodhpur Discom subsequently challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. Public servant status does not guarantee immunity Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that although the employees were recognised as public servants under Section 169 of the Electricity Act, they were employees of Jodhpur Discom. The Court noted that they were neither appointed by the State Government nor subject to termination by it. Their status as employees of a government-controlled company, therefore, did not automatically bring them within the protective ambit of Section 197 CrPC. The bench relied on its earlier decisions in Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar (1998) and Punjab State Warehousing Corporation v. Bhushan Chander (2016), reiterating that employees of government companies and public sector undertakings cannot claim protection merely because their organisations fall within the meaning of 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court observed that the Rajasthan High Court's decision rested on a legally flawed understanding of the provision. “The very basis of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court in favour of the respondents…giving them protection under Section 197 of Cr.P.C, is flawed being contrary to the settled judicial precedent of this Court,” the bench observed. Matter sent back to High Court The Supreme Court set aside the orders discharging the Executive Engineer, Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer. Their revision petitions have been remitted to the Rajasthan High Court for fresh consideration on merits. The High Court will now examine whether the material collected in the chargesheet is sufficient to justify the framing of charges against the three officials. The Supreme Court's ruling makes clear that employment in a government company, by itself, cannot be used as a shield against criminal prosecution.
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Punjab And Haryana High Court Orders Fresh Premature-Release Decision
Punjab and Haryana High Court · Editorial Team
The Punjab and Haryana High Court on 30 October 2026 set aside a decision deferring Mukesh’s premature-release case and ordered fresh consideration within four weeks of receipt of the certified order.
Judge / Bench — Sumeet Goel, J., authoring judge.
In CRWP-12097-2026 (2026:PHHC:194846), the Court required Haryana to apply its governing policy consistently. The seriousness of the original offence did not justify arbitrary differentiation between similarly situated convicts. Prison conduct, rehabilitation and other relevant circumstances must inform the decision. The order does not itself grant release.
Advocates appearing — Petitioner: Lajpat Rai Sharma, Advocate; State of Haryana: Gurmeet Singh, Additional Advocate General.
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Meghalaya High Court Upholds Interim Suspension, Orders POSH Safeguards
Meghalaya High Court · Editorial Team
The Meghalaya High Court upheld the Meghalaya Cricket Association secretary’s interim suspension and ordered POSH safeguards on 30 October 2026 (2026:MLHC:1217).
Judge / Bench — H.S. Thangkhiew, Judge.
The suspension remained interim, without deciding guilt. POSH compliance was directed preferably within six weeks.
Advocates appearing — WP 294 petitioner; WP 321/377 respondent 1: R.S. Rao and Dr. N. Mozika, Senior Advocates, with M. Myrchiang. WP 294 respondents 1–5,7; WP 321 petitioners: A.K. Bhuyan, Senior Advocate, with Dr. P.P. Medhi, K.V. Kharlyngdoh and W. Dkhar. WP 294 respondent 6; WP 321/377 respondent 2; WP 377 respondent 4: S. Khound; with G.C. Marboh for WP 294 respondent 6 and WP 377 respondent 4, and J.N. Rynjah, GA, for WP 321/377 respondent 2. WP 377 petitioner: S. Pandey; respondent 3: Not named in the judgment.
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Bombay High Court Rejects GST Predeposit On Disputed Interest Alone
Bombay High Court · Editorial Team
The Bombay High Court on 27 October 2026 held that percentage predeposit under Section 112(8)(b) does not extend to disputed interest alone where the entire tax has been paid.
Judge / Bench — M.S. Karnik and Sandesh D. Patil, JJ.; judgment by M.S. Karnik, J.
Allowing Roadway Solutions India Infra. Limited’s petitions (2026:BHC-AS:43662-DB), it quashed recovery communications and bank notices and directed withdrawal of the resulting debit restrictions. The interest dispute and refund claim remain open.
Advocates appearing — Petitioner: Darius Shroff, Senior Advocate, with Parag Khandhar, Kiran Chavan and Tapan Radkar, instructed by Cenex Legal LLP; State: Shruti D. Vyas, Additional Government Pleader, with A.R. Deolekar, AGP.
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MP High Court Revives Woman’s Right to Contest Suit, Flags Lawyer’s Misconduct Over Misleading WhatsApp Updates
Madhya Pradesh High Court · Sheikh Rayees
A litigant who diligently tracked her case but was repeatedly misled by her advocate cannot be penalised for her counsel’s negligence, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has ruled, restoring her opportunity to defend a civil suit and referring the advocate’s conduct to the State Bar Council for scrutiny. The Court set aside an ex-parte order passed against the woman after her lawyer failed to appear before the trial court, leaving her without a chance to contest the proceedings. Justice Sandeep N Bhatt, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, stressed that the justice system cannot allow an innocent litigant to lose her rights because of an advocate’s failure to discharge professional duties. “The petitioner should not suffer for the mistake committed by the counsel,” the Court observed, adding that intervention was necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
WhatsApp Chats Expose Repeated Misleading Updates
The petitioner, a resident of Chandigarh, was defending a civil suit before a Civil Judge in Indore. She had engaged local advocate Rohit Dubey to represent her in the proceedings. WhatsApp conversations submitted before the High Court showed that the woman had regularly sought updates about her case. However, her counsel allegedly continued to provide misleading information, gave a no-objection to a status quo order during the first appearance without any apparent justification, and eventually stopped appearing before the trial court. The lawyer’s absence led to an ex-parte order on September 23, 2025, closing the woman’s right to contest the suit. Further adverse orders followed in February and September 2026. After changing her counsel, the woman approached the High Court seeking relief against the orders passed in her absence. The matter was heard in Ku. Jyoti Singh vs Chetan Lashkari.
High Court Rejects Objections to WhatsApp Evidence
The respondent opposed the petition, questioning the admissibility of the WhatsApp chats. It was argued that the conversations were not supported by the electronic evidence certificate required under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. The respondent also pointed out that the petitioner had not lodged a formal complaint before the Bar Council against her former advocate. The High Court, however, declined to accept these objections as grounds to deny relief. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rafiq v. Munshilal (1981) and Malkiat Singh v. Joginder Singh (1998), the Court reiterated that litigants place their faith in advocates and should not be made to bear the consequences of their representatives’ negligence. The Court found that the woman had acted diligently in following up on her case, while the record raised serious concerns about her former counsel’s conduct.
State Bar Council Asked to Examine Disciplinary Action
Taking a stern view of the matter, the High Court observed that advocates are expected to discharge their responsibilities with integrity and sincerity. The Court indicated that the conduct of the petitioner’s former counsel appeared to attract scrutiny for possible professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. It directed the High Court Registry to forward the petition to the Madhya Pradesh State Bar Council within seven days, asking it to examine whether disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against the advocate. The Court also expressed concern over instances where advocates’ failures cause prejudice to the rights of litigants, observing that the Bar Council must take appropriate action against erring counsel.
Woman Gets Fresh Opportunity to Defend Civil Suit
Setting aside the ex-parte order, the High Court restored the petitioner’s right to contest the civil proceedings. The trial court has been directed to give her a fresh opportunity to file her written statement and defend the case on its merits. The ruling reinforces the principle that procedural setbacks caused by an advocate’s negligence should not automatically deprive a litigant of the opportunity to present her case. Advocate Raghvendra Singh Raghuvanshi appeared for the petitioner, while advocate Govind Rai Purohit represented the respondent.
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Allahabad High Court: CCTV Surveillance Cannot Come at the Cost of a Neighbour’s Privacy
Allahabad High Court · Sheikh Rayees
The right to secure one’s home does not extend to keeping a neighbour’s private life under surveillance. The Allahabad High Court has made it clear that privately installed CCTV cameras cannot be positioned in a way that intrudes into the privacy of adjoining residential premises. The observation came in Yogendra Maurya v. State of UP, where the Court dealt with a complaint over the placement of a neighbour’s surveillance camera. A Division Bench comprising Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Garima Prashad held that a CCTV camera positioned to interfere with a neighbour’s privacy would amount to an infringement of that right. “No private CCTV camera can be installed and positioned in such a manner as to interfere with the privacy of a neighbour,” the Bench observed. Camera allegedly captured movement at neighbour’s house The case arose from a writ petition filed by Yogendra Maurya, who alleged that his neighbour had installed a CCTV camera in a manner that captured the entry and exit points of his residence. Maurya contended that the camera recorded the movement of people visiting or leaving his house, thereby compromising the privacy of both his family and visitors. Taking note of the concern, the High Court reiterated that private surveillance cannot be used in a manner that encroaches upon the privacy of neighbouring residents. District Magistrate to decide removal plea within one month The High Court, however, stopped short of ordering the immediate removal of the CCTV camera. Instead, it disposed of the writ petition and directed Maurya to approach the concerned District Magistrate by filing an appropriate application seeking relief. The Bench further directed that if such an application is filed, the District Magistrate must consider and decide it within one month. The ruling places the responsibility on the district administration to examine complaints involving CCTV surveillance that allegedly crosses the boundaries of private security and infringes upon a neighbour’s privacy.
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LinkedIn Account Blocking: Delhi High Court Says Civil Suit, Not Writ Petition, Is the Proper Remedy
Delhi High Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Delhi High Court has ruled that users seeking to challenge the blocking or restriction of their LinkedIn accounts must pursue a civil suit rather than invoke the Court’s writ jurisdiction against the professional networking platform. In Mayank Jain v. Union of India & Ors., Justice Amit Mahajan held that LinkedIn does not discharge a public function or public duty that would make it amenable to writ proceedings. The Court clarified that a private entity can be brought within the scope of writ jurisdiction only when it performs functions that are fundamentally governmental in nature or exercises powers conferred by law.
LinkedIn's role remains private, Court says
The High Court acknowledged LinkedIn’s considerable influence in facilitating information-sharing and shaping public discussions. However, it distinguished the platform’s social significance from the performance of a legally recognised public duty. The Court observed that LinkedIn’s primary purpose is to provide a platform for professional expression and networking. Public discourse arising from its operations does not, by itself, convert its activities into a public function. It further noted that LinkedIn is not entrusted with any traditional governmental responsibility, nor is it legally required to provide its services to users. The platform’s operations, therefore, remain private in character, the Court held.
User challenges account restriction
The ruling came in a petition filed by Mayank Jain, who alleged that LinkedIn had restricted his account without issuing a prior warning or identifying the specific provisions of its User Agreement or Professional Community Policies that he had allegedly breached. Jain had approached the High Court seeking relief against the account restriction. During the proceedings, the Court noted that he had already taken his grievance to the Grievance Appellate Committee under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Considering the nature of LinkedIn’s functions, the Court held that neither the platform nor its resident grievance officer could be subjected to writ jurisdiction in the matter. The Court consequently indicated that a civil suit would be the appropriate legal avenue for challenging the account restriction. The decision reinforces the distinction between the influence of private digital platforms and the public duties that can bring an entity within the reach of constitutional writ remedies.
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Madhya Pradesh High Court Protects Journalist, Quashes FIR Over Ganesh Visarjan Violence Report
Madhya Pradesh High Court · Sheikh Rayees
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has quashed a criminal case against a journalist accused of promoting communal enmity through a report on violence during a Ganesh Visarjan procession, holding that reporting an actual incident of violence cannot, by itself, amount to an offence.
Justice Himanshu Joshi ruled that a news report must be examined in its entirety, including its content, context and whether it was intended to promote hostility between communities. The Court made the observations while deciding a petition filed by Uvesh Khan, also known as Uvesh Reporter, in Uvesh Khan @ Uvesh Reporter v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The case arose from a report published on Khan's YouTube news channel about violence during a Ganesh Visarjan procession in Silwani in September 2025. Police registered an FIR against him following allegations that his reporting created fear and confusion among members of the Hindu community and could trigger communal tensions. Khan approached the High Court seeking the cancellation of the FIR. His counsel argued that the report neither encouraged hostility between communities nor contained any material suggesting an intention to disturb communal harmony.
Court Finds No Specific Material Supporting Communal Enmity Charge
Examining the complaint, the Court found that it failed to identify any particular words, expressions or content in the journalist's report that could attract Section 196(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which deals with promoting enmity between different groups. The bench observed that allegations of creating fear, confusion or the possibility of communal discord were general in nature. It stressed that the possibility of public outrage or communal tension cannot, on its own, justify criminal proceedings when the essential elements of the alleged offence are not established. The Court also underlined the importance of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, noting that reporting on a sensitive public incident does not automatically warrant criminal action. Any restriction on such expression, it said, must have a valid legal basis.
FIR Quashed After Court Finds No Prima Facie Offence
In its order dated October 28, the High Court concluded that the material on record did not establish a prima facie case against Khan under Section 196(1) of the BNS. The Court accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings initiated against the journalist. The ruling reinforces the distinction between reporting an incident of violence and deliberately attempting to create communal hostility. A report concerning a sensitive event, the Court indicated, cannot be treated as an offence merely because it may provoke public concern or tension. Advocate Sankalp Kochar appeared for Khan. Government Advocate Pramod Pandey represented the State, while Advocate Raman Choubey appeared for the complainant.
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