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19 Nov 2026 — The Lawyers' Post — Daily Edition

Saved newspaper edition with 16 court reports.

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  1. Supreme Court restores prosecution over alleged forged land mutations
  2. Supreme Court reinstates CRPF constable after rejecting speculative medical findings
  3. Supreme Court upholds written test for Nagaland excise constable recruitment
  4. Supreme Court permits asset reconstruction company substitution in cheque prosecution
  5. Supreme Court restores transmission charges for Tuticorin power evacuation links
  6. Supreme Court orders ₹5 lakh payment to retired Central Bank employee
  7. Supreme Court strikes down UP Housing Board's ₹388-crore demand against Gaursons over replacement land
  8. Gold and silver ornaments recovered from accused insufficient to prove murder: Supreme Court acquits life convict
  9. Supreme Court Strikes Down Odisha Land Acquisition for Dalmia Cement Mining Project
  10. Karnataka High Court stays voter-deletion investigation pending electoral inquiry
  11. Delhi High Court orders individual review of minority-school salary grants
  12. Karnataka High Court warns social media users: Free speech does not justify defamatory or threatening posts
  13. Madras High Court frees man jailed for 25 days over social media post targeting CM Vijay
  14. Karnataka High Court scraps FIR over social media post claiming Siddaramaiah would give India’s wealth to Muslims
  15. AI-Generated Fake Supreme Court Judgment Triggers Strong Rebuke from Madhya Pradesh High Court
  16. Common Ship Management Not Enough to Justify Vessel Arrest for Another Ship’s Unpaid Crew Wages: Kerala High Court

Supreme Court restores prosecution over alleged forged land mutations

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 17 November 2026 restored criminal proceedings against a land-records officer in Dhule, holding that alleged forgery and dishonest property mutations were outside protected official duties.

Judge / Bench — Justices K.V. Viswanathan (author) and Alok Aradhe.

In 2026 INSC 1235, Ashok v. Mahesh, the Court held that prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC and Maharashtra’s Section 156(3) safeguard was unnecessary for the alleged acts. It set aside the High Court’s quashing order and directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate to continue the cases on their merits, without treating the Supreme Court’s observations as findings of guilt.

Advocates appearing — Appellant: Sagar Pahune Patil, Counsel. State: Raman Yadav, Counsel. Respondent 1: Siddharth S. Chapalgaonkar with Sneha Sanjay Botwe, Counsel.

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Supreme Court reinstates CRPF constable after rejecting speculative medical findings

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 16 November 2026 ordered immediate reinstatement of CRPF constable Mithilesh Kumar Pathak, with 50% back wages and other consequential benefits, after his removal for overstaying leave by 99 days.

Judge / Bench — Justices Satish Chandra Sharma (author) and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

In 2026 INSC 1219, the Court found that disciplinary authorities rejected his illness documents on conjecture about ink and missing hospital registration numbers, without checking with the doctor or pharmacy. Unauthorised absence did not necessarily mean wilful absence. Even accounting for earlier overstays and his failure to communicate, removal was grossly disproportionate in these circumstances.

Advocates appearing — Appellant and respondents: Not named in the judgment/order.

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Supreme Court upholds written test for Nagaland excise constable recruitment

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 16 November 2026 upheld Nagaland’s decision to add a written examination to recruitment for 46 excise constable posts, dismissing T. Akon Phom and other candidates’ appeal.

Judge / Bench — Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra (author) and Shree Chandrashekhar.

In 2026 INSC 1211, the Court found that the service rules permitted competitive examination or selection and that the advertisement empowered the recruitment board to issue corrections. The test at Class VIII level gave candidates a common assessment and reduced reliance on interviews. The corrigendum was publicised, and the appellants showed neither discrimination nor prejudice after participating with knowledge of the revised procedure.

Advocates appearing — Appellants: Diksha Rai, Counsel. State: K.N. Balgopal, Advocate General for Nagaland. Other respondents: Not named in the judgment/order.

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Supreme Court permits asset reconstruction company substitution in cheque prosecution

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 4 November 2026 upheld substitution of Assets Care and Reconstruction Enterprises Limited for Axis Bank in pending cheque-bounce proceedings against Kishore Avarsekar and others.

Judge / Bench — Justices Dipankar Datta (author) and Sheel Nagu.

In 2026 INSC 1217, the Court held that Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act can preserve criminal proceedings linked to assigned financial assets. Assignment alone does not make the company a holder in due course: it must prove transfer and delivery of the cheques, sufficient endorsement or assignment, and the statutory offence requirements at trial. Other available defences remain open.

Advocates appearing — Petitioners: Siddhartha Dave, Senior Advocate; Poonam Tahilyani, Advocate; Aniruddha Deshmukh, Advocate-on-Record. Respondents: Not named in the judgment/order.

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Supreme Court restores transmission charges for Tuticorin power evacuation links

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 18 November 2026 restored transmission charges imposed on Moxie Power, formerly Coastal Energen for using Power Grid Corporation’s Tuticorin links before completing its dedicated transmission line.

Judge / Bench — Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran (author).

In 2026 INSC 1237, the Court found that power necessarily passed through the two loop-in/loop-out links and the pooling station. Delay in the separate line towards Salem did not prevent their beneficial use. It set aside both appellate tribunal orders and restored the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission’s tariff decision, including liability until the dedicated line became operational on 27 October 2016.

Advocates appearing — Power Grid: Ramji Srinivasan, Senior Counsel. Generating company: Sajan Poovayya, Senior Counsel. TANGEDCO: Vrinda Bhandari, Advocate-on-Record. Other respondents: Not named in the judgment/order.

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Supreme Court orders ₹5 lakh payment to retired Central Bank employee

Supreme Court · Editorial Team

The Supreme Court on 18 November 2026 directed Central Bank of India to pay retired employee Ashok Kumar ₹5 lakh in full and final settlement after decades of litigation over service benefits.

Judge / Bench — Justices Dipankar Datta (author) and Sheel Nagu.

In 2026 INSC 1242, the Court held that a later claim for interest was based on a subsequent cause of action and was not barred by the earlier service judgment. Kumar had nevertheless used the wrong procedure by applying in the closed case instead of appealing dismissal of his fresh petition. Exercising Article 142, the Court ordered payment within two months of producing the judgment to the bank.

Advocates appearing — Bank: R. Basant, Senior Counsel. Amicus curiae: Gopal Jha, Counsel. Appellant-in-person: Ashok Kumar. Other respondents: Not named in the judgment/order.

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Supreme Court strikes down UP Housing Board's ₹388-crore demand against Gaursons over replacement land

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Court ruled that the Housing Board could not charge the developer afresh for alternative land provided in exchange for property acquired from its predecessors, particularly after the Board's own faulty allotment forced a second land exchange. The Supreme Court has dismissed appeals filed by the Uttar Pradesh government and the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, rejecting their attempt to recover ₹388 crore from real estate developer Gaursons India Pvt. Ltd. for alternative land allotted to it. A Bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe upheld the Allahabad High Court's decision quashing a June 2022 order issued by the State Chief Secretary and the consequential demand notice raised by the Housing Board in September 2022. The dispute originated from the acquisition of 12.047 acres belonging to the predecessors-in-interest of Gaursons for the Housing Board's Vasundhara Scheme in Ghaziabad. In 1995, the Supreme Court disposed of the Housing Board's appeal on the basis of a compromise under which the acquired land would be adjusted within the scheme. Part of it was to be used for water purification-related construction, while the remaining portion was to be kept open. The arrangement expressly provided that neither party would pay any additional value or compensation for the exchange. A faulty allotment triggered years of litigation Under an Exchange Deed executed in 2004, the Housing Board allotted two parcels of land, bearing Khasra Nos. 948 and 1454, in Arthala village to the original landowners. The parcels were subsequently sold to Gaursons in 2005. However, it later emerged that the land had already been resumed by the District Magistrate in 1994 for a bird sanctuary. Revenue records also described the properties as lake and banjar land. Consequently, the original beneficiaries could not obtain possession of the allotted land. Following years of litigation, the Housing Board executed another Exchange Deed in 2016, providing Gaursons with alternative land under the Siddharth Vihar Yojana. Gaursons paid ₹32.45 crore towards land conversion charges and subsequently constructed 2,476 general housing units and 450 economically weaker section (EWS) and lower income group (LIG) flats. These residential units were sold to homebuyers. The controversy resurfaced following a public interest litigation before the Allahabad High Court and a report submitted by a Special Investigation Team (SIT). In June 2022, the Chief Secretary directed that the land be allotted to Gaursons at the prevailing bulk sale rate. Acting on that direction, the Housing Board issued a demand notice seeking ₹388 crore from the developer. The Allahabad High Court subsequently struck down conditions (ii) and (iii) of the Chief Secretary's order, along with the consequential demand notice. The State government and Housing Board challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. State argued that residential use violated the original land conditions Before the Supreme Court, the State government and Housing Board contended that the 1995 compromise and Clause 4 of the 2004 Exchange Deed restricted the land's use to water purification-related purposes. They argued that the 2005 sale deed incorrectly described the property as residential and that the subsequent 2016 exchange had disregarded the original restrictions. The authorities also relied on the SIT report, alleging collusion between Housing Board officials and Gaursons. Opposing the appeals, Gaursons maintained that the Housing Board had retained and commercially developed the original acquired land within the more valuable Vasundhara Scheme without paying compensation to the original landowners. The developer argued that the 2016 Exchange Deed was not a fresh commercial allotment attracting payment at prevailing bulk sale rates. It also pointed out that ₹32.45 crore had already been paid as conversion charges. Supreme Court says Housing Board cannot transfer consequences of its own mistake to builder Examining the 1995 compromise, the Bench clarified that the expression 'said land' referred specifically to the property acquired from the original landowners and required the Housing Board to adjust that land within its scheme. The Court rejected the argument that the original compromise imposed permanent restrictions on every alternative parcel subsequently allotted by the Housing Board. "The compromise does not attach a perpetual restriction to whatever land the Housing Board might eventually give in exchange," the Bench observed. The Court then examined how the Housing Board had allotted the Arthala properties despite their prior resumption for a bird sanctuary and the adverse entries in the revenue records. It found that the authorities had failed to exercise due diligence before making the 2004 allotment, leaving the original landowners unable to take possession despite having committed no fault themselves. The Bench agreed with the High Court that the 2004 Exchange Deed had failed because of the Housing Board's own shortcomings. The Board was therefore required to arrange alternative land in place of the originally acquired property. Since the 2004 deed could not survive the defective allotment, its restrictions could not subsequently be imposed on Gaursons through the 2022 government order. The Court accordingly upheld the High Court's decision to strike down condition (iii) of the Chief Secretary's order, which sought to reintroduce the earlier land-use restriction. 2005 sale deed transferred rights over replacement land The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that the alternative land could not have been transferred to Gaursons. It observed that the property had been allotted in exchange for land belonging to the original owners, who were entitled to transfer their rights. "It is trite law that a person possessing title over a property has the absolute right of transferring and alienating the same to a third person," the Bench held. Examining the 2005 sale deed, the Court found that it transferred not only the allotted property but also the right to receive any other land that the Housing Board might subsequently provide in its place. Consequently, the rights arising from the later allotment also vested in Gaursons. 2016 Exchange Deed treated as a fresh registered arrangement The Bench attached particular significance to the 2016 Exchange Deed, noting that it was a separately registered instrument executed with the State government's no-objection and concerned a different plot under a different housing scheme. Unlike the earlier arrangement, the 2016 deed expressly described the substituted property as a residential freehold plot and permitted residential construction. The Court further examined Clause 13 of the deed, which incorporated the condition from the 1995 compromise that no additional value or consideration would be payable. It held that the parties had consciously chosen which terms of the original compromise would apply to the substituted property. The restrictions contained in the failed 2004 Exchange Deed could not automatically be extended to the 2016 arrangement. No justification for additional ₹388-crore payment Rejecting the demand for payment at the prevailing bulk sale rate, the Supreme Court considered the terms of the 2016 deed, the comparatively lower circle rates applicable in the Siddharth Vihar Scheme and the ₹32.45 crore already paid by Gaursons as conversion charges. The Bench also noted that the Housing Board had retained and developed the originally acquired land in the Vasundhara Scheme, which was more valuable than the replacement property, without paying compensation to the original landowners. In these circumstances, the Board could not demand an additional amount from Gaursons for the substituted land. The Court also considered the State's reliance on the SIT report alleging collusion between the developer and Housing Board officials, noting that Gaursons had disputed both the constitution of the SIT and its findings. Finding no merit in the appeals, the Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeal Nos. 9025 of 2026, 9026 of 2026 and 9027-9028 of 2026, thereby upholding the Allahabad High Court's judgment. The Bench also extended by three months the two-month period previously granted to the Uttar Pradesh government for allotment of the 450 EWS/LIG flats. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

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Gold and silver ornaments recovered from accused insufficient to prove murder: Supreme Court acquits life convict

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish a reliable chain of circumstantial evidence, observing that recovery of a victim's jewellery cannot, by itself, establish the accused's guilt for murder. The Supreme Court has overturned the murder conviction of a man sentenced to life imprisonment in a case involving the death of a woman whose body was discovered stuffed inside an iron drum in Karnataka. A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M Pancholi held that the prosecution had failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing towards the accused's guilt. The Court emphasised that merely recovering the deceased woman's gold and silver ornaments from the accused's house was insufficient to establish that he had committed the murder. The appeal challenged a Karnataka High Court judgment that had upheld the man's conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), now corresponding to Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), along with the life sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. Woman's body found inside iron drum The case dates back to 2013, when the woman's body was discovered inside an iron drum in Harapanahalli, Karnataka. According to the prosecution, the accused was allegedly involved in an illicit relationship with the deceased and suspected that she was also seeing another man. The prosecution claimed that, driven by jealousy, he strangled her using a plastic strap and subsequently took away her jewellery. It was further alleged that the accused led the police to his residence, where gold and silver ornaments belonging to the deceased were recovered. The Sessions Court had rejected the testimony of two witnesses, PW-13 and PW-14, concerning the claim that they had last seen the accused with the deceased. Their statements had been recorded after an unexplained delay of 58 days. Despite rejecting this evidence, the trial court convicted the accused primarily on the basis of the jewellery recovery. It also acquitted him of the charge of causing the disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC, now corresponding to Section 238 BNS. The Karnataka High Court subsequently relied on the last-seen-together evidence as well and upheld the murder conviction and life sentence. Defence challenges reliance on circumstantial evidence Before the Supreme Court, Senior Advocate A Sirajudeen argued that the entire prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence and failed to satisfy the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra. The defence contended that the alleged motive had not been established and questioned the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the woman's body. It was also argued that the High Court had relied on the last-seen-together testimony without properly addressing the Sessions Court's finding regarding the unexplained 58-day delay in recording the witnesses' statements. Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Sanwat Khan v State of Rajasthan and Raj Kumar @ Raju v State (NCT of Delhi), the accused argued that recovery of the victim's ornaments could not independently sustain a conviction for murder. Opposing the appeal, Additional Advocate General Avishkar Singhvi submitted that the prosecution had established the homicidal death and the motive behind the crime. The State also argued that the accused had failed to explain the recovery of the jewellery and that the theft and murder were part of the same transaction. Alleged illicit relationship could not establish motive After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court found serious shortcomings in the prosecution's attempt to establish the alleged motive. The Bench observed that both the Sessions Court and the High Court had wrongly treated general knowledge or suspicion about an alleged illicit relationship as proof that the accused had a motive to commit murder. The deceased's nephew, PW-5, and her husband, PW-7, had admitted during their testimony that they had no personal knowledge of the alleged relationship. Neither witness established that the accused suspected the deceased of being involved with another man or that any quarrel had taken place between them over the alleged affair. The Court therefore concluded that the prosecution's theory regarding the motive was based on assumptions rather than established evidence. It observed that the alleged motive was a matter of conjecture and surmise and could not be treated as a proven circumstance against the accused. Last-seen evidence requires independent corroboration The Bench also referred to Kanhaiya Lal v State of Rajasthan while examining the prosecution's reliance on the last-seen-together circumstance. Reiterating the settled legal position, the Court explained that merely establishing that an accused was last seen with the deceased does not automatically establish guilt. Such evidence must be supported by proximate and independent circumstances connecting the accused with the commission of the crime. The Supreme Court also examined the Sessions Court's decision to reject the statements of PW-13 and PW-14 because of the unexplained delay in their recording, a finding that the High Court had not adequately addressed while relying on their testimony. Ultimately, the Bench found that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution did not form the complete and unbroken chain required to sustain a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the Karnataka High Court's judgment and acquitted the accused of the murder charge.

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Supreme Court Strikes Down Odisha Land Acquisition for Dalmia Cement Mining Project

Supreme Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Supreme Court has overturned Odisha government's 2021 land acquisition for a mining project involving Dalmia Cement in Sundargarh district, ruling that the State ignored crucial legal safeguards, including mandatory consent from gram sabhas and affected families. A Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma set aside the acquisition covering land in three villages, namely Kukuda, Bihabandha and Lanjiberna. The ruling also overturned a September 2024 decision of the Orissa High Court that had upheld the State's action. In Bibol Toppo v. Odisha, the Court found that the acquisition had proceeded despite the gram sabhas of the affected villages rejecting the proposal in January 2020. It criticised the High Court for treating the statutory requirement of gram sabha consent as little more than a procedural exercise. The Bench observed that there was not even documentary consent from the gram sabhas, let alone any meaningful approval for the acquisition.

80% consent requirement could not be bypassed

The dispute originated in 2015, when Dalmia Cement approached the Odisha government seeking acquisition of surface rights over agricultural land to expand its mining operations. The company already held a mining lease valid until 2040. The villagers challenged the acquisition, arguing that the State had ignored their objections and failed to follow the safeguards prescribed under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The Orissa High Court had previously ruled that consent from 80 per cent of affected families was unnecessary because ownership of the acquired land would vest in the State. It had also observed that such consent, if required, could be obtained at different stages of the acquisition process. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation. It clarified that the nature and purpose of the acquisition determine which statutory safeguards must be followed. Since the land was being acquired exclusively for mining operations by a private company, Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act required the prior consent of at least 80 per cent of affected families. The Bench emphasised that this consent had to be obtained during the social impact assessment process, before the government proceeded to consider the acquisition proposal. Approval collected at a subsequent stage could not rectify the initial violation.

Gram sabha approval mandatory in Scheduled Areas

The Court also highlighted the constitutional and statutory protections applicable to the affected villages, which fall within a Scheduled Area under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. Referring to Section 41(3) of the 2013 Act, the Bench held that prior consent of the gram sabhas was independently mandatory before acquiring land in such areas. It clarified that this requirement could not be dispensed with even when the government invoked urgency provisions.

Social impact assessment process found deficient

The Supreme Court identified further irregularities in the acquisition proceedings, particularly concerning the mandatory public hearing on the draft social impact assessment report. Information obtained under the Right to Information Act indicated that the hearing could not take place because of COVID-19 restrictions. The final assessment report also failed to reflect the views and concerns of the affected residents. The Bench additionally questioned the independence of the expert group tasked with evaluating the assessment report. A land acquisition adviser associated with Dalmia Cement had been included in the group, raising concerns about the fairness of the evaluation process. The Court remarked that the arrangement effectively turned the expert group's deliberations into a predetermined exercise, likening it to a "fixed match". It further clarified that Dalmia Cement's existing mining lease did not give the company or the State any exemption from the requirements of the land acquisition law. Once Odisha decided to acquire the land under the 2013 Act, compliance with its statutory protections became compulsory. Finding multiple violations of the law, the Supreme Court quashed the land acquisition proceedings along with the connected notifications and government orders.

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Karnataka High Court stays voter-deletion investigation pending electoral inquiry

Karnataka High Court · Editorial Team

The Karnataka High Court on 17 November 2026 stayed further investigation in the voter-deletion case against Vasantha Lakshmi G.S., deferring the State’s request to vacate interim protection.

Judge / Bench — Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde.

In W.P.31887/2026, the Court found no prima facie forgery where the petitioner had not disowned her signatures. It said the statutory electoral-roll inquiry should precede reconsideration of criminal investigation and required the Election Commission’s decisions on the disputed Form 7 applications. The FIR was not quashed.

Advocates appearing — Petitioner: Aruna Shyam M., Senior Advocate, for Aiyappa K.G., Advocate. Respondent 1: K. Shashi Kiran Shetty, Advocate General, with B.N. Jagadeesha, SPP-I. Respondent 2: Shathabish Shivanna, Advocate. Respondent 3: S.R. Dodawad, Advocate.

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Delhi High Court orders individual review of minority-school salary grants

Delhi High Court · Editorial Team

The Delhi High Court on 17 November 2026 set aside blanket refusal of salary grants for 100 Delhi Tamil Education Association appointments.

Judge / Bench — Justice Sanjeev Narula (author).

In 2026:DHC:10169, the Court required individual decisions within twelve weeks. Minority autonomy does not waive statutory eligibility; B.Ed. alone did not meet the governing Assistant Teacher rules. Refusal of aid would not extinguish employees’ remuneration claims against the schools.

Advocates appearing — DTEA in W.P.14795/2025 and respondent 3 in W.P.17099/2025: Kartikeye Dang, Advocate. Employees: Diya Kapur, Senior Advocate, with Naibedya Dash, Shruti Jain, Naman Singh, Anil Dalal, Sumit and Kshitiz, Advocates. GNCTD: Avnish Ahlawat, SC (GNCTD), with N.K. Singh, Aliza Alam, Mohnish Sehrawat and Ananya Saxena, Advocates. UOI: Kartik Sharma, Manhan Chalwa and Pearl Sharma, Advocates; also Devvrat Yadav, Advocate, in W.P.(C)17099/2025.

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Karnataka High Court warns social media users: Free speech does not justify defamatory or threatening posts

Karnataka High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against a woman accused of running an online harassment campaign involving fabricated allegations, morphed content and inflammatory claims against a man. The Karnataka High Court has cautioned that having a social media account does not give anyone unrestricted freedom to publish whatever they wish, emphasising that online expression must remain within the constitutional boundaries of free speech. Justice Suraj Govindaraj made the observation while dismissing petitions seeking to quash criminal proceedings against a woman named Shubha and another accused, Mohan, over allegations of defamation, threats and the circulation of inflammatory material targeting Thanusha M Shetty. "A social media handle being available would not give a free license to any person to post any message that a person wants. The messages which are posted ought to be within the exercise and limits of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution," the Court observed. Allegations of online harassment and fabricated content The dispute arose from a complaint filed by Shetty, who alleged that he had been targeted through a coordinated social media campaign involving morphed images, fabricated material and false claims about his religious identity. According to the complaint, the accused circulated content portraying him as belonging to the Christian community, allegedly with the intention of creating hostility against him. The posts also allegedly accused Shetty of committing rape, forcing an abortion, having links to the Sowjanya murder case, insulting Hindu temples and involvement in offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The allegations further included an attempt to murder Shetty by running him over with an autorickshaw. Court refuses to interfere with criminal proceedings In an order dated October 15, the High Court rejected Shubha's plea to quash a criminal case involving allegations of circulating inflammatory material and attempting to commit an offence under Sections 353(2) and 62 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. Through a separate order passed on the same day, the Court also dismissed another petition filed by Shubha and Mohan seeking to quash proceedings under Section 353(2) BNS in connection with the alleged online campaign against Shetty. The accused had argued that the criminal proceedings were initiated out of political and personal vengeance because of their support for the Dharmasthala temple. The Court, however, found no sufficient grounds to accept that argument or terminate the proceedings at the present stage. It observed that the complaint, when considered on its face, raised allegations that warranted a proper investigation into the circulation of allegedly fabricated and inflammatory content through social media. "The allegations in the complaint, taken at face value, disclose a case requiring investigation into the alleged circulation of false and inflammatory material through social media. The petitioners have not established that the FIR is liable to be quashed at this stage," the Court held. The High Court therefore declined to interfere, leaving the allegations to be examined through the criminal investigation and trial process. Advocate Kethan Kumar appeared for the petitioners, while High Court Government Pleader Ranjith Kumar N represented the State.

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Madras High Court frees man jailed for 25 days over social media post targeting CM Vijay

Madras High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Court found that the accused had been wrongly denied bail three times despite facing only bailable charges, and ordered its judgment to be circulated among judicial officers in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. The Madras High Court has granted bail to a man who spent 25 days in prison over allegedly offensive social media remarks directed at Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Vijay, despite the offences registered against him being bailable. Justice N Ramesh, while hearing the case titled Raja Gopal Vs State, held that three earlier orders rejecting the man's bail applications were legally unsustainable. The Court observed that the accused was entitled to bail from the day of his arrest upon furnishing the required bond. It also directed the Registrar General to circulate the ruling among judicial officers across Tamil Nadu and Puducherry to prevent similar errors. "What the record does show is that he has been in prison for more than three weeks in a case in which the law entitled him to be released on the day of his arrest, upon his furnishing bail," the Court remarked. Arrest followed social media post against Vijay The petitioner, P Raja Gopal, was booked under Section 296(b) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act for allegedly posting obscene and abusive comments against Chief Minister Vijay on X (formerly Twitter) on June 12. Although the FIR was registered earlier, police arrested him only on October 22, nearly four months later. Following his arrest, a Metropolitan Magistrate in Chennai rejected his bail application, citing the seriousness of the allegations, the pending investigation and concerns that he might abscond or tamper with evidence. Two subsequent applications seeking bail were also rejected by the Principal Sessions Court. High Court says courts applied wrong legal standards Examining the sequence of orders, the High Court pointed out that both provisions invoked against Gopal dealt with bailable offences. Justice Ramesh observed that considerations such as the gravity of allegations, the stage of investigation and the possibility of tampering with evidence were relevant while deciding bail in non-bailable cases. They could not be used to deny an accused the statutory right to bail in a bailable offence. The Court further clarified that a person seeking bail in a bailable case was not required to demonstrate a change in circumstances merely because an earlier bail application had been rejected. It also highlighted the statutory obligation of police officers to inform an arrested person, in a bailable case, about their entitlement to secure release upon furnishing bail. However, the case records contained nothing to establish whether Gopal had been informed of this legal right following his arrest. The High Court clarified that its decision to correct the earlier orders should not be understood as an adverse finding against the judicial officers who had passed them. Bail granted with ₹25,000 bond Allowing the petition, the High Court directed that Gopal be released on bail upon executing a bond of ₹25,000 and furnishing two sureties for an equivalent amount. In a further step aimed at ensuring judicial officers follow the correct legal position in bailable cases, the Court directed the Registrar General to circulate the judgment among judicial officers handling remand and bail matters across Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. A copy was also ordered to be forwarded to the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Academy. Advocate S Ganesh appeared for Gopal, while Government Advocate Durai Gunasekaran represented the State.

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Karnataka High Court scraps FIR over social media post claiming Siddaramaiah would give India’s wealth to Muslims

Karnataka High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Court ruled that criticising a political statement or sharing a news report does not automatically amount to promoting communal hatred, particularly when there is no reference to hostility between two communities. The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused of promoting religious enmity through a social media post suggesting that former Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah intended to distribute the country's wealth to Muslims. Justice Rajesh Rai K held on November 6 that the contents of the post, even if accepted as alleged, failed to establish the essential elements of an offence under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with promoting enmity between different groups on religious grounds. The Court noted that the accused had shared a TV9 news report carrying a photograph of Siddaramaiah, accompanied by a headline about distributing the nation's wealth to Muslims. The accompanying message reflected his disagreement with the reported statement. It found no specific reference to two separate communities or groups that could establish an attempt to create hostility between them. "In the absence of any specific reference to two distinct groups or communities, such an act, by itself, would not attract the ingredients of Section 153A of IPC," the Court observed. How the criminal case began The proceedings originated from a complaint filed on April 29, 2024, by a Congress party worker. The complaint alleged that several individuals had been publishing posts from April 22 through a social media account operating under the name 'BhikuMhatre (Modi's Family) @MumbaichaDon'. One of the posts featured Siddaramaiah addressing the media and carried a caption claiming that the Congress manifesto specifically referred to Muslims in connection with the distribution of wealth. The complainant alleged that the post was intended to create hostility between Hindus and Muslims, disturb public peace and damage the reputation of the Congress party. Following the complaint, Bengaluru Cyber Crime Police registered an FIR against Nayak under Section 153A IPC and Section 66(C) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Petitioner argued that sharing a news report was not a criminal offence Appearing for the accused, Senior Advocate Aruna Shyam submitted that her client had merely circulated a news clip published by TV9. She argued that the post neither targeted nor humiliated any particular community and contained no attempt to provoke hatred or violence. The petitioner's side also questioned the police investigation, pointing out that the authorities had not verified the authenticity of the underlying news report before registering the criminal case. It was further argued that the complaint was driven by political motives. Opposing the petition, the State government contended that the post was intended to generate communal hostility by suggesting that the Congress party planned to take wealth belonging to Hindus and distribute it exclusively among Muslims. The State maintained that the investigation was still at an early stage and the allegations required further examination. Court explains why Section 153A was not attracted Examining the material, the High Court noted that the TV9 report carried the headline, "I will share the wealth of the nation to Muslims: CM Siddaramaiah". The Court also took note of the absence of any investigation into whether the news report itself was genuine. Reiterating the scope of Section 153A IPC, it explained that the provision requires an attempt to promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between at least two distinct communities or groups. A statement that merely provokes feelings within one community, without targeting or referring to another group, would not automatically fall within the provision. "Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract Section 153A," the Court observed. It further explained that the provision is intended to address conduct prejudicial to communal harmony and acts that disturb, or are likely to disturb, public tranquillity. The Court also emphasised that expressing disagreement or dissent through legitimate and lawful means is protected under fundamental rights, subject to reasonable restrictions. Another factor recorded by the Court was that the complainant had not appeared despite receiving notice. It cautioned that allowing criminal proceedings to continue on the basis of frivolous or vexatious complaints could cause serious damage to an accused person's reputation. Concluding that neither the complaint nor the FIR disclosed the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 153A IPC, the Court held that continuing the proceedings would constitute an abuse of the judicial process. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR along with all consequential proceedings against the accused. Advocate Suyog Herele also appeared for the petitioner.

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AI-Generated Fake Supreme Court Judgment Triggers Strong Rebuke from Madhya Pradesh High Court

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken serious exception to the State government's reliance on a non-existent Supreme Court judgment in its court submissions, observing that the fabricated legal precedent appeared to have been generated using an Artificial Intelligence (AI) tool. Justice Vivek Kumar Singh criticised the State for filing pleadings containing an invented case name alongside an unrelated case citation. The Court described the manner in which the reply was prepared as careless and irresponsible, warning against such reckless use of AI in legal proceedings. The issue arose in Piyush Mani Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, a case concerning the dismissal of a police officer from service. In its reply, the State relied heavily on a purported Supreme Court decision titled State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.S. Mohammad Nisar, citing it as (2008) 5 SCC 230. The judgment was cited to support the argument that courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot re-examine evidence. However, the High Court discovered that no such Supreme Court judgment existed. The citation actually belonged to Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), a case dealing with the suspension of a sentence during a criminal appeal. The Court observed that the mismatch strongly suggested that the State had blindly relied on AI-generated material without carrying out even basic verification.

Court warns against blindly relying on AI-generated legal material

Justice Singh emphasised that pleadings submitted before a Constitutional Court carry significant responsibility and cannot be treated as documents prepared through casual or unchecked methods. The Bench pointed out that inserting fictitious judgments without verifying their existence wastes valuable judicial time and risks misleading the Court. It specifically cautioned the State against repeating such practices and directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the State Law Secretary and the Advocate General. The Court also stressed that the Advocate General's office must ensure that every legal proposition and judicial citation is properly checked by the drafting counsel before documents are sworn and submitted before the High Court.

Police officer's dismissal also set aside

Apart from the issue of fabricated case law, the Court examined the legality of the petitioner's dismissal from service. Piyush Mani Tiwari was serving as an Acting Sub-Inspector at the State Situation Room, Special Branch, Police Headquarters, Bhopal, when he was dismissed in 2024. The action followed a complaint by a woman working as a cleaner/sweeper, who accused him of inappropriate behaviour. Tiwari challenged the dismissal on the ground that the State had removed him without conducting either a preliminary inquiry or a regular departmental investigation. Defending its decision, the State invoked Article 311(1), read with Articles 311(2)(b) and 311(3) of the Constitution, to justify dispensing with a formal inquiry. It argued that conducting an inquiry into a complaint involving a woman employee could prolong the matter, cause distress and trigger public outrage. The State also expressed concerns that witnesses could face intimidation and that immediate action was necessary to preserve discipline and public confidence in the police force. The High Court found these explanations insufficient to justify bypassing the constitutional safeguards governing dismissal from public service. In its November 17 judgment, the Court noted that there was no material on record demonstrating that Tiwari had threatened or intimidated the complainant or any other witness. There was also no evidence of an atmosphere of violence or insubordination that could have prevented witnesses from participating in an inquiry. Consequently, the Court quashed the dismissal order and directed the State to reinstate Tiwari. It nevertheless permitted the government to initiate a regular departmental inquiry in accordance with the law.

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Common Ship Management Not Enough to Justify Vessel Arrest for Another Ship’s Unpaid Crew Wages: Kerala High Court

Kerala High Court · Sheikh Rayees

The Kerala High Court has ruled that a vessel cannot be detained to recover unpaid crew wages arising from employment on entirely different ships merely because all the vessels are managed by the same shipping company. A Division Bench of Chief Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Syam Kumar VM, in Light House Marine Service India Pvt Ltd v. Charter and Parties Interested in the Vessel MT Ocean Faye & Ors., held that arresting another vessel in such circumstances would require, at the very least, a prima facie showing of commonality of interest between the shipowners and a clear intention to defraud creditors. The Bench made it clear that a common ship manager does not automatically establish common ownership. Managing multiple vessels and owning them are legally distinct relationships. The ruling came while dismissing an appeal filed by Light House Marine Service India Pvt Ltd, a manning agency that had sought the arrest of MT Ocean Faye over unpaid crew wages relating to three other vessels managed by Star Voyages Shipping Services LLC.

Dispute arose over wages paid to crews of three vessels

Light House Marine Service claimed that it had paid the wages of crew members serving aboard MT Eastern Pearl, MT Fast Kathy and MT Sea Fidelity after Star Voyages allegedly failed to fulfil its contractual obligations. According to the agency, the ship management company subsequently refused to reimburse the payments despite repeated demands. Seeking to secure recovery of the amount, the agency approached the High Court for the arrest of MT Ocean Faye, another vessel managed by Star Voyages. A single-judge Bench initially ordered the vessel's arrest in May 2024. MT Ocean Faye was later released after security was furnished. However, parties interested in the vessel challenged the arrest, following which another single judge set aside the order. Light House Marine then approached the Division Bench.

Manning agent cannot claim rights of a shipowner

Before the Division Bench, the appellant relied on Sections 4(1)(o) and 4(1)(p), read with Section 5(2) of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017. It argued that these provisions permitted the arrest of a vessel to secure maritime claims arising from obligations connected with other ships under the same management. The respondents countered that the wage dispute concerned three separate vessels and that the appellant had no contractual relationship with MT Ocean Faye. Accepting the respondents' position, the High Court distinguished the legal standing of a manning agent from that of a bareboat or demise charterer. The Bench observed that Light House Marine was merely a crew supplier operating under a contractual arrangement with the ship manager. Such an arrangement did not give it a legal position comparable to that of a charterer with rights connected to the vessel. The Court emphasised that the appellant had failed to establish the essential ownership connection required to justify the arrest.

Section 5(2) cannot operate independently

The Bench also examined the scope of Section 5 of the 2017 Admiralty Act. It clarified that Section 5(2), which permits the arrest of another vessel in specified circumstances, cannot be read in isolation from the conditions laid down under Section 5(1). The Court found no established common ownership between MT Ocean Faye and the three vessels whose crews were involved in the wage dispute. It also noted that the owners of those three vessels had not even been impleaded in the proceedings. More importantly, the agency's claim arose from its contractual dealings with Star Voyages over reimbursement of crew wages. It had not demonstrated any independent legal entitlement against MT Ocean Faye. The Bench concluded that a dispute between a crew-supplying agency and a ship management company cannot, by itself, become grounds for detaining an unrelated vessel simply because the same entity manages both. Finding no legal justification for the arrest, the Kerala High Court upheld the decision setting it aside and dismissed the appeal.

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